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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
Vol. 53 DECEMBER 1954 No. 2
IMPACT OF THE COMMERCIAL CODE ON LIABILITY
OF PARTIES TO NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS IN
MICHIGAN
Roy L. Steinheimer, Jr.*
S IcE the Uniform Commercial Code is now effective in Pennsyl-
vania and is under active consideration by official bodies in other
states, it seems appropriate to investigate in some detail the impacts
which this proposed legislation would have upon the accumulated busi-
ness, legislative and judicial understanding and experience in the com-
mercial law area in a specific jurisdiction. As an illustration of the
problems which will be faced by judges, lawyers and businessmen in
any jurisdiction which adopts the code, the writer has chosen to analyze
some impacts which the code would have on commercial law in Mich-
igan. Space limitations make it necessary to select some small part
of the code for this analysis. To this end, the writer has chosen the
subject of liability of parties to negotiable instruments.1 It is hoped
that this section-by-section study of an important segment of the code
against the backdrop of over one hundred years of commercial experi-
ence in Michigan will give some appreciation of the problems involved
and the ends to be achieved by adoption of the code.
Section 3-401. Signature.
(1) No person is liable on an instrument unless his signature
appears thereon.
(2) A signature is made by use of any name, including any trade
or assumed name, upon an instrument, or by any word or mark used in
lieu of a written signature.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
I Article 3, Part 4 of the code.
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This section of the code is simply a restatement of the provisions of
section 18 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law2 and would
work no changes in Michigan law.'
Section 3-402. Signature in Ambiguous- Capacity.
Unless the instrument clearly indicates that a signature is- made in
some other capacity it is an indorsement.
Section 17 (6) of the NIL' provides that "where a signature is so
placed upon an instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the per-
son making the same intended to sign, he is to be deemed an indorser."
Section 63 of the NIL' provides that "[a] person placing his signature
upon an instrument, otherwise than as maker, drawer or acceptor is
deemed to be an indorser, unless he clearly indicates by appropriate
words his intention to be bound in some other capacity."6  Under
these statutory provisions, the Michigan courts have held that one who
signs a note in the lower right-hand comer, apparently as co-maker,
cannot offer parol evidence, even as between the original parties to the
instrument, to show that he signed as accommodation indorser.' How-
ever, a co-signer who adds the word "indorsed" to his signature in the
lower right-hand corner of a note is deemed an indorser.8 On a note
reading "John Johnson ... . does promise to pay . . ." and signed by
John Johnson and Mike Gunter in the lower right-hand comer, Gunter
was held to be an indorser.9 The foregoing holdings would also be
appropriate under section 3-402.
Section 3-403. Signature by Authorized Representative.
(1) A signature may be made by an agent or other representative,
and his authority to make it may be established as in other cases of
2 Hereinafter usually referred to as "NIL." Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.20, Mich.
Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.60.
3 See, e.g., Peoples State Bank v. Trombly, 241 Mich. 199, 217 N.W. 47 (1928).
4 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.19, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.59.
5 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.65, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) § 19.105.
6At common law in Michigan, an irregular indorser who placed his indorsement on
an instrument before delivery of the instrument to the payee was liable as a co-maker.
Wetherwax v. Paine, 2 Mich. 555 (1853); Rothschild v. Grix, 31 Mich. 150 (1875);
Smith v. Long, 40 Mich. 555 (1879) (distinguishing the Wetherwax and Rothschild
cases); Marine Trust Co. of Buffalo v. Roden, 218 Mich. 693, 188 N.W. 397 (1922)
(discussing change in the rule under the NIL).
7 Price v. Klett, 255 Mich. 354, 238 N.W. 253 (1931). See also Cook v. Brown, 62
Mich. 473, 29 N.W. 46 (1886).
8 Peoples Nat. Bank v. Dicks, 258 Mich. 441, 242 N.W. 825 (1932).
9 O'Dess v. Gunter, 258 Mich. 667 at 668, 242 N.W. 804 (1932). See also Fox v.
Mitchell, 302 Mich. 201, 4 N.W. (2d) 518 (1942).
[ Vol. 53
19541 UNIFoRMu COMMERCIAL CODIE 173
representation. No particular form of appointment is necessary to
establish such authority.
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to an
instrument is also personally obligated unless the instrument names the
person represented and shows that the signature is made in a representa-
tive capacity. The name of an organization preceded or followed by
the name and office of an authorized individual is a signature made in
a representative capacity.
Section 3-403(1) is simply a restatement of section 19 of the NIL."
Michigan cases dealing with the problem of establishing agency to sign
negotiable instruments would be unaffected."
Section 3-403 (2) attempts to solve this problem-when an agent,
acting with authority from his principal, signs an instrument "A,
agent," who is liable on the instment? A similar question is pre-
sented when a representative signs "T, Trustee." This problem in its
infinite factual variations has constantly plagued our courts. At com-
mon law the holdings were varied and confusing. Some predictability
of results in this area was sought by adoption of section 20 of the NIL. 2
However, reluctance of some courts to depart from common law hold-
ings and failure of others to apply section 20 realistically have left much
to be desired.
For example, at common law in Michigan, when an authorized
agent signed an instrument "A, agent," the rule was that "as between
one of the original parties and a third party, the addition of the word
10Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.21, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.61.
"1 The following cases involve various phases of express and implied authority to
sign negotiable instruments and of agency by estoppel. Reichert v. State Say. Bank, 274
Mich. 126, 264 N.W. 315 (1936); Kay v. County of Wayne, 274 Mich. 90, 264 N.W.
300 (1936); McIntosh v. Detroit Sav. Bank, 247 Mich. 10, 225 N.W. 628 (1929);
Lonier v. Ann Arbor Say. Bank, 162 Mich. 541, 127 N.W. 685 (1910); Quinn v. Quinn
Mfg. Co., 201 Mich. 664, 167 N.W. 898 (1918); Armstrong v. Steams, 156 Mich. 597,
121 N.W. 312 (1909); Stevens v. McLachlan, 120 Mich. 285, 79 N.W. 627 (1899);
First Nat. Bank v. Stone, 106 Mich. 367, 64 N.W. 487 (1895); Davenport v. Stone, 104
Mich. 521, 62 N.W. 722 (1895); Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Detroit Knitting and Corset
Works, 68 Mich. 620 (1888); Genesee Say. Bank v. Michigan Barge Co., 52 Mich. 438
(1884); Shipman v. Byles, 65 Mich. 690, 32 N.W. 898 (1887); New York Iron Mine
v. First Nat. Bank of Negaunee, 39 Mich. 644 (1878); Stroh v. Hinchman, 37 Mich. 490
(1877); Carrier v. Cameron, 31 Mich. 373 (1875); Littell v. Fitch, 11 Mich. 523 (1863);
Kimball v. Cleveland, 4 Mich. 606 (1857); Farmers and Mechanics' Bank v. Troy City
Bank, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 457 (1844).
1 2 "Where the instrument contains, or a person adds to his signature, words indicating
that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, or in a representative capacity, he is not liable
on the instrument if he was duly authorized, but the mere addition of words describing
him as an agent, or as filling a representative character, without disclosing his principal,
does not exempt him from personal liability." Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.22, Mich.
Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.62.
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'agent' is not sufficient to put such third party upon inquiry" but "as
between the immediate parties to the instrument, parol evidence is
admissible to show the real character of the transaction."'" In other
words, as between the immediate parties, the agent could avoid personal
liability on the instrument by introducing parol evidence showing that
he had signed for a principal.'4 It is obvious that section 20 of the NIL
was intended to change this result and to charge the agent with personal
liability on the instrument even though the dispute arose between the
immediate parties to the instrument. However, the Michigan courts
have blithely ignored section 20 and continue to adhere to the common
law rule.'5
The code would again attempt to establish a uniform rule bf per-
sonal liability on the agent who signs his name to an instrument "unless
the instrument names the person represented and shows that the signa-
ture is made in a representative capacity."' The code is thus designed
to put an end to the use of parol evidence in the "A, agent" situation
in Michigan.
Another facet of this signature problem which has caused difficulty
involves corporate signatures on instruments. Ideally, such an instru-
ment would be signed 'T Co., by A, Pres." thus indicating that only Y
Co. is to be bound. As a matter of common sense and business usage,
no different intention is indicated where the instrument is signed "T
Co., A, Pres." or "A, Pres., Y Co." or where an instrument reading 'T
Co. promises to pay" is signed "A, Pres." Yet, not infrequently, the
courts have found A personally liable on the instrument in these
situations.' 7
In Michigan, a note reading "We promise" and signed
"Drury Petroleum Corp.
E~ecutive Board: J, E. Anderson,
Chas. G. Walker"
IsKeidan v. Winegar, 95 Mich. 430 at 432, 54 N.W. 901 (1893). However, when
the authorized agent simply signed the instrument "A," parol evidence was not admissible
under any circumstances to show agency. Finan v. Babcock, 58 Mich. 301, 25 N.W. 294
(1885).14 The common law rule varied in other jurisdictions "from the refusal of such courts
as the one in Maine to admit such evidence, even in actions between original parties, to
the practice, like that in New Jersey, to allow the evidence even in actions by holders in
due course." AILERa, CAsEs oN B=Ls AND NoTns 31, n. 25 (1947).
15Leington State Bank v. Rose City Creamery Co., 207 Mich. 81, 173 N.W. 481
(1919) (decided without even a reference to the NIL); Parker v. Parker, 282 Mich. 158,
275 N.W. 803 (1937). Since "no person is liable on the instrument whose signature does
not appear thereon" (NIL, §20), is anyone bound on the instrument as a result of the
holding in these cases?
18 Code, §3-403(2). Italics added.
1T See cases cited in BEuTEL's BANxoN NECrxALE 1NsThumEmrs LAw 413 (1948).
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was held not binding on the individuals.18 On the other hand, the
court admitted parol evidence to establish personal liability on a note
reading "we promise" and signed "Edmund Tropp, Boulevard Terrace
Co., Pres."'9
In an effort to avoid some of this confusion, section 3-403 (2) pro-
vides that 'The name of an organization preceded or followed by the
name and office of an authorized individual is a signature made in a
representative capacity."
Section 3-404. Unauthorized Signatures."0
(1) Any unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of
the person -whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded
from denying it; but it operates as the signature of the unauthorized
signer in favor of any person -who in good faith pays the instrument or
takes it for value.
(2) Any unauthorized signature may be ratified for all purposes
of this Article. Such ratification does not of itself affect any rights of
the person ratifying against the actual signer.
Difficulties have arisen under the NIL when an unauthorized agent
purports to sign for a principal. Obviously the purported principal has
no liability on the instrument. But is the unauthorized agent liable?
The present law provides that the agent "is not liable on the instrument
if he was duly authorized,' but does this warrant the implication that
the agent, if not authorized, is liable? Cardozo, C. J., in a decision
which has been widely followed, concluded that the unauthorized agent
is liable.
22
In Annis v. Pfeiffer,23 a guardian who executed a note in a represen-
tative capacity to secure money for her ward was relieved of personal
liability to the payee despite lack of authority to sign as guardian. The
court found that the payee did not intend the guardian to be personally
liable and believed, knowing all the facts but mistaking the law, that
l8Wright v. Drury Petroleum Corp., 229 Mich. 542 at 543, 201 N.W. 484 (1924).
See also Farmers and Mechanics' Bank v. Troy City Bank, 1 Doug. 457 (1844); Traverse
City Depositors' Corp. v. Case, 297 Mich. 304, 297 N.W. 501 (1941).
19 Simon v. Tropp, 252 Mich. 559 at 560, 233 N.W. 415 (1930). See also Tilden
v. Barnard, 43 Mich. 376, 5 N.W. 420 (1880); Cooper v. Sonk, 201 Mich. 655, 167
N.W. 842 (1918).20 "Unauthorized signature" means a signature made without actual, implied or
apparent authority and includes a forgery. Sec. 1-201 (43).
21 NIL, §20; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.22, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.62.
22 New Georgia Nat. Bank of Albany, Ga. v. J. & G. Lippman, 249 N.Y. 307, 164
N.E. 108 (1928).
28278 Mich. 692 at 694 and 695, 271 N.W. 568 (1937).
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the guairdian was authorized. In reaching this result, the Michigan
court recognized that under section 20 of the NIL, "[tihe courts gen-
erally have construed the section to carry the converse of the statutory
declaration of lack of personal liability, i.e., that one who signs in a rep-
resentative capacity is personally liable if he is not duly authorized."
However, the court decided that "such converse construction does not
establish an absolute rule" and in this situation would constitute an
"unwarranted extension of the inference of liability."
Under the code, liability of the unauthorized agent is not left to
inference. Section 3-404 (1) provides that any unauthorized signa-
ture ". . . operates as the signature of the unauthorized signer in favor
of any person who in good faith pays the instrument or takes it for
value." Would Annis v. Pfeiffer be decided differently under the
code?- Probably so. The signature as guardian was unauthorized.
Payee took the instrument for value in the mistaken but good faith
belief that the signature was authorized. It would seem far-fetched
to say that since payee knew all of the facts but was mistaken as to the
guardian's legal authority on the facts, he took in bad faith. Of course,
one who takes an instrument knowing that the signature was unauthor-
ized acts in bad faith and should not recover.
In line with section 23 of the NIL,24 section 3-404 (1) provides
that "[a]ny unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative as that of the
person whose name is signed unless he ratifies it or is precluded from
denying it." Section 3-404 (2) provides that "[any unauthorized
signature may be ratified for all purposes of this Article." Decisions in
Michigan dealing with ratification of unauthorized signatures would
be unchanged 5  The provision that a person may be "precluded from
24 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.25, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.65.
25 McDonough v. Heyman, 38 Mich. 334 (1878); Schmid v. Village of Franlkfort,
141 Mich. 291, 104 N.W. 668 (1905); Furlong v. Manufacturers Nat. Bank, 285 Mich.
517, 281 N.W. 309 (1938). See also McLellan v. Detroit File Works, 56 Mich. 579
(1885). Cf. Houseman-Spitzley Corp. v. AmericanState Bank, 205 Mich. 268, 171 N.W.
543 (1919); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 261 Mich. 450, 246 N.W.
178 (193).
In the Furlong case, supra, K forged indorsements on checks drawn by his employers
(plaintiffs) and received payment of the checks from the drawee banks (defendants).
Defendant banks argued ratification of the forgeries based on the fact that plaintiffs ac-
cepted partial restitution from K and took K's promissory note for the balance of the
monies he had wrongfully obtained. Also, plaintiffs retained K in their employ. In deny-
ing that these facts established ratification of the forgeries, the court distinguished Union
Guardian Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 271 Mich. 323, 259 N.W. 912 (1935), which
held that where plaintiff prosecuted its claim to final judgment against the forger, there
was an election of remedies and no recovery could later be had against the bank. The
doctrine of the Union Guardian Trust Co. case, which is closely akin to theories of ratifi-
cation, has been followed in Ielmini v. Bessemer Nat. Bank, 298 Mich. 59, 298 N.W. 404
(1941) and Weaver v. Detroit Bank, 330 Mich. 366, 47 N.W. (2d) 650 (1951).
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denying" authenticity of his signature contemplates the result in Mich-
igan cases which have estopped the maker of a note from denying the
genuineness of his signature because of delay in notifying the holder
of the forgery.26 Also, it would encompass the result in cases which
have estopped the owner of a check from denying the genuineness of
a forged indorsement because of delay in notifying the cashing bank,
against whom recovery was sought, of the forgery."
Section 3-405. Imposters; Signature in Name of Payee.
(1) An indorsement by any person in the name of a named payee
is effective if
(a) an imposter by use of the mails or otherwise has in-
duced the maker or drawer to issue the instrument to
him or his confederate in the name of the payee; or
(b) a person signing as or on behalf of a drawer intends the
payee to have no interest in the instrument; or
(c) an agent or employee of the drawer has supplied him
with the name of the payee intending the latter to have
no such interest.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect the criminal or civil liabil-
ity of the person so indorsing.
The NIL does not deal with the imposter problem. Where A poses
as B and receives an instrument payable to the order of B, is A's indorse-
ment of B's name a forgery? The answer in many jurisdictions hinges
on whether the "dominant intent' of the maker or drawer was to pay
to the physical person A who was posing as B or to pay to B. In other
jurisdictions, A's indorsement of B's name is a forgery without regard
to the maker's or the drawer's intention.18  Section 3-405 would elimi-
nate speculation about intention and establish the uniform rule that in
the imposter situation, indorsement of the payee's name "by any per-
son" would be effective.
26 Kole v. Lampen, 191 Mich. 156, 157 N.W. 392 (1916). See also Clark v. Detroit
Curling Club, 298 Mich. 339, 299 N.W. 99 (1941).27 Brown v. People's Nat. Bank, 170 Mich. 416, 136 N.W. 506 (1912); National
Production Co. v. Guardian Nat. Bank of Commerce, 281 Mich. 230, 274 N.W. 774
(1937). In the latter case the court raised the estoppel even though the cashing bank was
found to have paid out the monies negligently on the check bearing the forged indorsement.
Neither case mentions NIL, §23. See also dictum of Cooley, C.J., in Stroh v. Hinchman,
37 Mich. 490 at 497 (1877), indicating that failure to prosecute for unauthorized signa-
ture on negotiable paper would estop one from "disputing any paper made without
authority subsequently."
28 For a discussion of the problem, see Abel, "The Imposter Payee: or, Rhode Island
Was Right," 1940 Wis. L. Riv. 161.
1954 ]
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There is a dearth of imposter cases in Michigan and from the few
cases reported it is impossible to say which of the above approaches to
the problem the Michigan courts would follow. In Peninsular State
Bank v. First National Bank" one Hunchik had a savings account
($2,700) with plaintiff. Plaintiff received a request through the mails
from a party claiming to be Hunchik for withdrawal of the $2,700
deposit. Plaintiff issued its manager's check for $2,700 payable to
Hunchik. The check, bearing what purported to be Hunchik's indorse-
ment, was paid to defendant by plaintiff. The court found that "the
party claiming to be Hunchik was an imposter and his indorsement on
the check was a forgery." Plaintiff would have recovered but for a
finding of negligence giving rise to estoppel. Under section 3-405,
the imposter's indorsement of Hunchik's name would not be a forgery,
indicating that the code would change Michigan law in this area.30
As to the fictitious payee problem, section 9 (3) of the NIL3'
provides that an instrument payable to the order of a "fictitious or non-
existing" person is payable to bearer where "such fact was known to
the person making it so payable." This provision fails to give protec-
tion to a drawee or to purchasers of an instrument in the common
situation where a dishonest agent or employee causes his principal or
employer to draw an instrument payable to the order of a fictitious
payee and then indorses in the name of a fictitious payee. Since the
principal or employer, as drawer, has no knowledge that the instrument
is payable to a fictitious payee, the Michigan courts have consistently
treated such instruments as payable to order rather than to bearer.3
As a result, the drawee and purchasers of the instrument must take the
consequences of having dealt with an instrument bearing a forged
indorsement.
Under the code, the analysis in these cases would be changed.
Section 3-405 provides that an indorsement "by any person" in the
name of a named payee is effective if "an agent or employee of the
drawer 3 has supplied him with the name of the payee intending the
latter to have no" interest in the instrument. This provision would
29245 Mich. 179 at 181, 222 N.W. 157 (1928).
3 0 Compare Beckwith v. Webber, 78 Mich. 390, 44 N.W. 330 (1889).
8 Mic. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.11, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.51.3 2 Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 261 Mich. 450, 246 N.W. 178
(1933); Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County Bank, 252 Mich. 163, 233 N.W. 185
(1930); Houseman-Spitzley Corp. v. American State Bank, 205 Mich. 268, 171 N.W. 543
(1919); Harmon v. Old Detroit Nat. Bank, 153 Mich. 73, 116 N.W. 617 (1908). See
also Shaw, Kendall & Co. v. Brown, 128 Mich. 573, 87 N.W. 757 (1901).
s3 Note that the provision is limited to drafts. 'Draft" is defined by §3-104 as "an
order.),
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validate indorsements which have been customarily treated as forged
indorsements in Michigan thus working substantial changes in
liability.34
Neither the NIL nor the code specifically covers the problem of
fictitious indorsees.3 5
Section 3-406. Negligence Contributing to Alteration of Unauthor-
ized Signature.
Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to a
material alteration of the instrument or to the making of an unauthor-
ized signature is precluded from asserting the alteration or lack of
authority against a holder in due course or against a drawee or other
payor who pays the instrument in good faith and in accordance with the
reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's -business.
At common law an instrument which was materially altered was
completely void even in the hands of a holder in due course."' This
harsh rule was modified by section 124 of the NIL which gives a
holder in due course the right to enforce payment of the altered instru-
ment "according to its original tenor." However, section 124 of the
NIL still leaves open to doubt the question of what effect negligence in
drawing the instrument so as to invite alteration should have upon
liability.
The English courts decided in Young v. Grote,"8 that as between
bank and depositor the drawee bank could properly debit the account
of the drawer for the amount of a check negligently drawn so as to
invite alteration. In the limited context of the bank-depositor relation-
ship, the doctrine of Young v. Grote has been generally accepted in
this country. 9 But should negligence which facilitates alteration play
any part in questions of liability on negotiable instruments generally?
For example, should the good faith holder of a note or bill of exchange
negligently drawn so as to invite alteration be enforceable against the
drawer or maker in its altered form? Also, what effect does section 124
have on the problem? The courts of this country have disagreed.
84 While the fictitious payee question was not discussed in Nat. Bank of Detroit v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 291 Mich. 36, 288 N.W. 325 (1939), the facts indicate that under
the code the question could probably have been effectively raised to alter the result.
35 The New York courts recently faced this interesting problem in Hall v. Bank of
Blasdell, 306 N.Y. 336, 118 N.E. (2d) 464 (1954).
38 See, for example, Wait v. Pomeroy, 20 Mich. 425 (1870); Holmes v. Tramper, 22
Mich. 427 (1871).
37 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.126, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.166
38 4 Bing. 253 (1827).
89 See 23 MicH. L. Rnv. 775, 777 (1925).
1954 ] 179
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In Michigan, the problem was raised at common law in the early
case of Holmes v. Trumpe4 ° where the maker executed a time note.
The promise ended with the printed words "with interest at ...."
Payee or a subsequent holder filled in the words "10 per cent" after
these printed words. A good faith holder sought recovery against the
maker on the note as altered. The court found that it was "a complete
and valid note, drawing the legal rate of... seven per cent." The holder
contended, however, that the maker was negligent in issuing the note
in this form and should be required to pay according to its altered
terms. Even assuming that the maker was negligent, the court refused
to depart from the common law doctrine that an altered instrument
was void and denied recovery as a result. "Whenever a party in good
faith signs a complete promissory note, however awkwardly drawn, he
should, we think, be equally protected from its alteration by forgery
in whatever mode it may be accomplished ...."-4 In distinguishing
Young v. Grote, the court confined its application to disputes between
bank and depositor over payment of altered checks.
In the recent case of Commonwealth Bank v. Dunn2 the ques-
tion of the effect of negligence facilitating alteration was raised under
the NIL. Defendant-drawer drew a typewitten check because the payee,
an employee of drawer, said that the check-writing machine was not
working. The employee-payee raised the amount of the check from
$4.98 to $504.98 and deposited it in plaintiff-bank. Defendant-drawer
stopped payment on the check. Plaintiff-bank, as a holder in due
course, sued defendant-drawer for the altered amount of the check,
claiming defendant-drawer was estopped to deny liability on the altered
contract because of negligence in the manner of drawing the check.
4022 Mich. 427 at 429 (1871).
411d. at 435. The same result was reached in Bradley v. Mann, 37 Mich. 1 (1877),
on substantially similar facts. See also Graham v. Sinderman, 238 Mich. 210, 213 N.W.
200 (1927).
If the court had found in Holmes v. Trumper that the note was incomplete, i.e.,
contained blank spaces, when issued, the negligence of the maker in so issuing. the instru-
ment would have rendered him liable on the note in its completed form. See Weidman v.
Symes, 120 Mich. 657 at 660, 79 N.W. 894 (1899), in which there was a promise to pay
"one hundred dollars at - . Value received with interest at - percent per
annum." Without authority, the blanks were filled in with the words "ten (10) percent"
and the figure "10" respectively. The court treated this as an incomplete instrument
containing blank spaces and. held the maker liable on the note in its completed form to a
good faith purchaser. The court based liability on the finding that it was negligent to
issue an incomplete instrument containing blank spaces. The court distinguished Holmes
v. Trumper on the ground that "there was no blank space left to be filled. The words '10
percent' were added at the end of the note." Accord, First State Say. Bank v. Webster,
121 Mich. 149, 79 N.W. 1068 (1899). Cf. First Nat. Bank v. Carson, 60 Mich. 432, 27
N.W. 589 (1886). NIL, §14 contemplates the result reached in the Weidman case.
42335 Mich. 665, 57 N.W. (2d) 294 (1953).
[ Vol. 53
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The court allowed recovery according to the original tenor of the instru-
ment, i.e., $4.98. It thus recognized that section 12443 of the NIL had
changed the common law rule voiding altered instruments entirely but,
in line with Holmes v. Trumper, it decided that negligence in drawing
the instrument would not affect liability on the altered instrument.
Under the code, "[a]ny person who by his negligence substantially
contributes to a material alteration of the instrument. . . is precluded
from asserting the alteration. . . against a holder in due course .... "
Whereas negligence of the drawer or maker is now immaterial in Mich-
igan in alteration situations," the code would make such negligence a
material fact and if the judge or jury should find that the negligence
substantially contributed to the alteration, the maker or drawer would
be estopped to deny liability to a holder in due course on the instrument
as altered.
Section 3-406 also provides that the drawer of a bill or check whose
negligence "substantially contributes" to the alteration cannot assert
such alteration against his drawee who has paid the instrument accord-
ing to its altered terms "in good faith and in accordance with the
reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's. . . business." Since
the Michigan courts have approved the doctrine of Young v. Grote
this provision would work no significant change in the law.
Section 3-406 would also operate where negligence substantially
contributed "to the making of an unauthorized signature." For
example, a drawer or maker who used a signature stamp would be
estopped to deny liability on the instrument to a holder in due course
if his negligent manner of keeping the stamp substantially contributed
to the forgery of his signature. And in such circumstances, the drawer
could not object to his account being charged by the drawee who paid
the forged instrument. Similarly, if the negligence of the drawer or
4 3 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.126, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.166.
44 Of course, the fact that inviting open spaces are left in the otherwise complete
instrument may be material to the question of whether an alteration could actually have
been made. In Pearson v. Hardin, 95 Mich. 360, 54 N.W. 904 (1893), the fact of
whether the instrument had been altered was disputed. The court upheld a line of ques-
tioning intended to show that open spaces had been left before the statements of the
principal amount in the instrument. The purpose of such testimony was carefully limited,
however, as follows (at p. 367):
'"It was important to ascertain whether such spaces were left when the note was
executed. If not, the note could not easily have been raised, and the probability of its
genuineness was greater. Defendant stated unequivocally that such spaces were left, and
the questions were within the range of legitimate cross-examination. The language of the
[trial] court, in overruling the objection, carefully pointed out the bearing of the testimony,
and expressly disavowed any irpose to treat the evidence as tending to establish a legal
liability, by reason of defendant's negligence in failing to fill such blanks." Italics added.
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maker substantially contributed to the making of an unauthorized in-
dorsement, he would be precluded from questioning the title of a holder
in due course and the drawer could not prevent the drawee from
making a charge to his account upon good faith payment of the instru-
ment. Such negligence might be found where the drawer or maker
negligently mailed the instrument to a person having the same name as
the intended payee; where the drawer otherwise negligently placed the
instrument in the forger's hands with the means of misleading others
as to the forger's right to indorse;45 or where the drawer was negligent
in failing to discover and stop the continued issuance of fraudulent
checks bearing forged indorsements.4 6 Apparently a payee who negli-
gently contributed to a forgery of his indorsement by careless control
over a signature stamp would be estopped to deny the title of a sub-
sequent holder in due course or to deny liability as an indorser. Also,
the payee could not recover monies received by the holder in due course
on theories of conversion or assumpsit. Similarly, it would seem that
the negligent payee would be denied recovery on theories of conversion
or assumpsit against the drawee who paid the instrument.
Section 3-407. Alteration.
(1) Any alteration of an instrument is material which changes
the contract of any party thereto in any respect, including any such
change in
(a) the number of relations of the parties; or
(b) an incomplete instrument, by completing it otherwise
than as authorized; or
(c) the writing as signed, by adding to it or by removing
any part of it.
(2) As against any person other than a subsequent holder in due
course
(a) alteration by the holder which is both fraudulent and
material discharges any party whose contract is thereby
changed unless that party assents or is precluded from
asserting the defense;
(b) no other alteration discharges any party and the instru-
ment may be enforced according to its original tenor,
45 See Peninsular State Bank of Detroit v. First Nat. Bank, 245 Mich. 179, 222 N.W.
157 (1928).
46 See Detroit Piston Ring Co. v. Wayne County & Home Say. Bank, 252 Mich. 163
at 175-179, 233 N.W. 185 (1930). Cf. Harmoi v. Old Detroit Nat. Bank, 153 Mich.
73, 116 N.W. 617 (1908).
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or as to incomplete instruments according to the author-
ity given.
(3) A subsequent holder in due course may in all cases enforce
the instrument according to its original tenor, and when an incomplete
instrument has been completed, he may enforce it as completed.
Section 3-407 (1) defines material alteration as one which "changes
the contract of any party thereto in any respect."47  This provision is
generally in accord with the approach of the Michigan courts to the
problem of material alteration. Under the code, as now, alteration of
the principal amount,48 change of the interest rate,49 change of the
maturity date,50 erasure of part of the contract terms,5' addition of an
interest provision, 2 and change of the name of the payee5s would be
material alterations. Under the code, as at present, the addition of
words not affecting the contract would not be material alterations. 54
The provision of section 3-407 (1) (a) that a change in the "num-
ber or relations of the parties" shall constitute a material alteration if it
changes the contract of any party is in accord with existing Michigan
law. Insertion of the name of an additional payee would continue to
be a material alteration.55 However, as is presently the case, addition
of the signature of a co-maker5 signature by an anomalous indorser,"r
or substitution of one form of security for another" would not be mate-
rial alterations.
47 Compare NIL, §125 [Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.127, Mich. Stat. Ann.
(1937) §19.167] which lists items that constitute material alteration.4 8 Commonwealth Bank v. Dunn, 335 Mich. 665, 57 N.W. (2d) 294 (1953);
Graham v. Sinderman, 238 Mich. 210, 231 N.W. 200 (1927); Pearson v. Hardin, 95
Mich. 360, 54 N.W. 904 (1893). See also Baird v. Salnave, 174 Mich. 409, 140 N.W.
650 (1913).
49 Bradley v. Mann, 37 Mich. 1 (1877); Holmes v. Trumper, 22 Mich. 427 (1871);
Sheldon v. Hawes, 15 Mich. 518 (1867).
50jourden v. Boyce, 33 Mich. 302 (1876). See also Ensign v. Fogg, 177 Mich. 317,
143 N.W. 82 (1913).
51 Nelson v. Dutton, 51 Mich. 416, 16 N.W. 791 (1883).
52 Swift v. Barber, 28 Mich. 503 (1874).
5 3 Graham v. Sinderman, 238 Mich. 210, 213 N.W. 200 (1927).
54 Garwood v. Burton, 265 Mich. 408, 251 N.W. 564 (1933) (dictum); Leonard v.
Phillips, 39 Mich. 182 (1878).
55 Aldrich v. Smith, 37 Mich. 468 (1877).56 Gano v. Heath, 36 Mich. 441 (1877); Miller v. Finley, 26 Mich. 249 (1872). In
the latter case the court suggested however (at 253), that where several co-makers stand
in the relation of sureties for one co-maker as principal, their contracts might be injuriously
affected by the later addition of other sureties. For example, if one of the sureties becomes
bankrupt, a solvent surety's "obligation to pay may be increased, and his right of contribu-
tion against co-sureties diminished, by the change."
57 Ensign v. Fogg, 177 Mich. 317, 143 N.W. 82 (1913).58 Dart Nat. Bank v. Burton, 258 Mich. 283, 241 N.W. 858 (1932).
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Section 3-407 (1) (b), which makes unauthorized completion of
an incomplete instrument a material alteration,"" seems to be consistent
with Michigan common law.60 Under the NIL, however, the subject
of incomplete instrnuents is treated separately from material altera-
tion of instruments.6' To this extent there would be a change under the
code but it is without real significance.
Sections 3-407 (1) (c) provides that material alteration shall
include a change. in the contract of any party which results from
"adding to . . . or by removing any part of' the writing as signea.
This provision is in accord with the Michigan cases holding that un-
authorized removal of a memorandum from the bottom of a note is a
material alteration.62 Similarly, unauthorized separation of a note
from a conditional sale contract63 or from any other form of contract
64
would continue to be material alterations.
Rights of holder of an altered instrument -who is not a holder in due
course: While the code definition of material alteration does not
significantly change existing Michigan law, there would be important
changes in the legal consequences flowing from such alteration.
Under section 12465 of the NIL the altered instrument in the hands of
a holder other than a holder in due course is "avoided" as to all parties
except one who "made, authorized, or assented to the alteration, and
subsequent indorsers'." Under section 3-407 (2) (b), such a holder
could enforce the altered instrument "according to its original tenor,
or as to incomplete instruments according to the authority given"
against any party whose contract was not actually changed by the altera-
tion. Thus, under the code, discharge of a party because of material
alteration becomes a personal defense of the party whose contract is
changed thereby and anyone whose contract is not affected by the
alteration is liable to the extent indicated. The instrument is not
"avoided" as under the NIL.
59 See also §3-115 of the code.
60 W~idman v. Symes, 120 Mich. 657, 79 N.W. 894 (1899); First State Say. Bank
v. Webster, 121 Mich. 149, 79 N.W. 1068 (1899).
61 Incomplete instruments, NIL, §§14 and 15 [Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§439.16
and 439.17, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §§19.56 and 19.57]. Alteration, NIL, §§124 and 125
[Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§439.126 and 439.127, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §§19.166
and 19.167].
62 Wait v. Pomeroy, 20 Mich. 425 (1870); First Nat. Bank v. Carter, 138 Mich. 421,
101 N.W. 585 (1904).
63Toledo Scale Co. v. Gogo, 186 Mich. 442, 152 N.W. 1046 (1915); Stevens v.
Venena, 202 Mich. 232, 168 N.W. 531 (1918).
64 Kewanee Utilities Co. v. Runzel, 256 Mich. 345, 239 N.W. 325 (1931); Muske-
gon Citizens Loan & Investment Co. v. Champayne, 257 Mich. 427, 241 N.W. 135 (1932).
65Mich. Comp. Laws (194&) §439.126, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.166.
[ Vol. 5 3
UNrWoR COMAMRCIL CODE
Furthermore, such discharge occurs only if: (1) the material altera-
tion is made by "the holder"; (2) the material alteration is "fraud-
ulene; and (3) the party claiming discharge has neither assented to
the alteration nor has precluded himself from asserting the defense of
alteration.
(1) What is meant by the provision that the alteration must be
made by "the holder"? Does this expression refer to any holder of the
instrument or only to the holder at the time claim is made and the de-
fense asserted?66 If it means the latter, this would represent a change in
Michigan law. 7 If it means the former, this provision would still be
an innovation in Michigan law. While in some Michigan cases the
alteration seems to have been made by a holder there is no indication
that a finding of this fact was necessary to the result. 9 Sometimes
there is no finding as to who made the alteration" or there is an actual
finding that the alteration was not made by a holder.7' Nevertheless,
the parties to the instrument are held to be discharged by the alteration.
Under the code, absent a finding that the alteration was made by "the
holder" (whatever this means), the parties would be liable according
to the original tenor of the instrument or, if an incomplete instrument,
according to the authority actually given to complete it.
Do the words "the holder" include acts of agents of the holder?
The drafters' comment indicates "that the acts of the holder's author-
ized agent or employee or of his confederates, are to be attributed to
him. ' 72  In Michigan, alteration of an instrument by an agent of a
holder is regarded as "spoliation" by a stranger unless the holder knows
6OThe drafters' comment is of little help here. It simply states that "[sjpoliation by
any meddling stranger does not affect the rights of the holder." (Comment 3a.) So far
as the holder who finally asserts a claim on the instrument is concerned, a prior holder who
altered the instrument would seem to be a "meddling stranger." Nor does the definition
of the word "holder" clarify the situation. "Holder" is defined as "a person who is in
possession of... an instrument . . . drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order or
to bearer or in blank." Sec. 1-201(20).
67 Stevens v. Venema, 202 Mich. 232, 168 N.W. 531 (1918).
6sPrior to the NIL, courts often distinguished between alteration by a party to the
instrument and "spoliation" by accident or by a stranger. The NIL, however, seemed to
abandon this distinction. 16 HAnv. L. Rnv. 255 at 260 (1903). Perhaps the code
intends to restore this distinction.
69 Swift v. Barber, 28 Mich. 503 (1874); Johnson v. Johnson Estate, 66 Mich. 525,
33 N. W. 413 (1887). See also Stewart v. First Nat. Bank, 40 Mich. 348 (1879).
70Toledo Scale Co. v. Gogo, 186 Mich. 442, 152 N.W. 1046 (1915).
71 Since the code makes unauthorized completion of an incomplete instrument a
material alteration, see Bronson v. Stetson, 252 Mich. 6, 232 N.W. 741 (1930), where
the unauthorized completion was made by an agent of the maker of a note.
7 2 Sec. 3-407, comment 3a.
19541
MicHiGAN LAw lEvi[lw
of or consents to the alteration."3 Such a result would seem to violate
the spirit of the code.
(2) The alteration must be "fraudulent" as well as material.
Blanks filled in the honest belief that the completion is made with
authority and alterations favorable to the obligor are not likely to be
fraudulent.74  Beyond this, it is difficult to say what would constitute
fraudulent intent. In some cases, of course, fraudulent intent will be
fairly evident as, for example, where the principal amount is raised or
the interest rate is increased or the name of the payee is changed.75
Whether this requirement that the alteration be "fraudulent"
would add a new element to alteration cases in Michigan is difficult
to say. In Aldrich -. Smith76 the alteration was made in the belief that
it was "only supplying an oversight. . . and with no dishonest pur-
pose." The court held that whether the alteration was made honestly
or dishonestly was immaterial.77 But in Johnson v. Johnson Estate78
lack of fraudulent intent in the alteration influenced the court in its
decision. Ordinarily, however, there is no discussion of the intentions
motivating the alteration. To the extent that proof of fraudulent in-
tent would become an essential element of the defense of alteration
under the code, there would seem to be a change in Michigan law.
(3) Once material alteration by the holder with fraudulent intent
is shown, the party whose contract was changed by the alteration is dis-
charged unless "that party assents or is precluded from asserting the
defense." The concept of assent to alteration would not be new to
Michigan law.79 One interesting question should be noted, however.
In Stevens v. Venema8 ° defendant signed a conditional sale contract
and promissory note attached together by a perforated line. The note
was separated from the contract and was transferred to plaintiff who
7
3 OvWosso Sugar Co. v. Arntz, 244 Mich. 351, 221 N.W. 179 (1928).
74 Comment 3b. See Ensign v. Fogg, 177 Mich. 317, 143 N.W. 82 (1913), where
the principal amount of a note was payable one year after date and date of note was
changed from April 14, 1909 to May 14, 1909.
75 Stevens v. Venema, 202 Mich. 232, 168 N.W. 531 (1918), indicates that detach-
ment of a promissory note from a conditional sale contract will be regarded as presumptively
fraudulent.
76 37 Mich. 468 (1877).
77 Dictum in Wait v. Pomeroy, 20 Mich. 425 at 428 (1870), states: "And if the
alteration is material, it makes no difference whether apparently favorable or prejudicial."
78 66 Mich. 525, 33 N.W. 413 (1887).
79NIL, §124 [Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.126, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937)
§19.166]. Swift v. Barber, 28 Mich. 503 (1874); Stewart v. First Nat. Bank of Port
Huron, 40 Mich. 348 (1879). See also Nelson v. Dutton, 51 Mich. 416, 16 N.W. 791
(1883).
80 202 Mich. 232 at 236 and 239, 168 N.W. 531 (1918).
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had notice of these circumstances. Defendant set up the defense of
alteration by separation of the note from the contract. Plaintiff coun-
tered with the assertion that defendant had assented to the separation of
the documents. The alleged assent consisted of this statement which
appeared just above the perforation: "The attached note is tendered in
settlement of this order and the company is authorized to detach same
when this order is approved and shipped." The court refused to find
assent because the "natural inference to be drawn from incorporating
a detachable promissory note in such an instrument in a transaction of
this nature is a purpose to deceive." Under the code conditional sale
transactions would be fully recognized in Michigan. Would this suf-
ficiently disperse the clouds of suspicion which have obscured condi-
tional sale transactions in Michigan so that such assents would become
effective?
81
The provision that a party may be precluded from asserting the
defense of alteration would apparently not be new to Michigan law. 2
Should a person who issues an instrument in incomplete form be pre-
cluded because of negligence from asserting the defense of alteration
by unauthorized completion?8 3 Presumably if there is either assent
or preclusion under section 3-407 (2), the instrument can be enforced
in its altered form.
Rights of holder in due course of altered instrument: Since, under
section 3-407(3), an altered instrument cannot be avoided as to a
subsequent holder in due course but, instead, can "in all cases" be
enforced by such holder "according to its original tenor," it would make
no difference, as under section 3-407(2), whether the alteration was
made by "the holder" or was "fraudulent." This is in line with Mich-
igan law."'
81 In Muskegon Citizens Loan & Investment Co. v. Champayne, 257 Mich. 427, 241
N.W. 135 (1932), assent to alteration by detachment of a note from an advertising con-
tract was found simply from the fact that the "perforation between that portion of the
paper on which the note was printed and the portion which contained the terms of the
advertising contract . . . was ample notice to defendants that the note as such could be
and probably would be detached and used in regular course as negotiable instruments are
used." (p. 429) Unlike Stevens v. Venema, plaintiff was a holder in due course in this
case. However, why shouldn't this same approach be used in applying the assent provisions
of §3-407(2)? See also Kewanee Private Utilities Co. v. Runzel, 256 Mich. 345, 239 N.W.
325 (1931).
82 See Acme Food Co. v. Tousey, 148 Mich. 697, 112 N.W. 484 (1907).
83Compare §3-406.




Under sections 1485 and 158' of the NIL a distinction is drawn be-
tween the rights of recovery by a holder in due course on an incomplete
instrument which is delivered into the channels of commerce by author-
ity of the maker or drawer and an incomplete instrument which is not so
delivered. In the former case, the holder in due course can enforce the
instrument as completed.7 In the latter case, the instrument is un-
enforceable. The code would abolish this distinction as to incomplete
instruments delivered with or without authority. Section 3-115(2),
which deals with incomplete instruments, provides that if- the "com-
pletion is unauthorized the rules as to material alteration apply (Sec-
tion 3-407), even though the paper was not delivered by the maker or
drawer.""s Section 3-407(3) provides that "when an incomplete in-
strument has been completed, he [the holder in due course] may en-
force it as completed." Hence the holder in due course 9 could recover
on the instrument as completed whether or not the maker or drawer of
the incomplete instrument had authorized its delivery into the channels
of commerce.
In some circumstances the holder in due course could recover on
an instrument in its altered form rather than according to its original
tenor. This would be true where, under section 3-406, a party's negli-
gence has substantially contributed to the alteration. Also, while sec-
tion 3-407(3) makes no provision for the rights of a holder in due course
when a party has assented to the alteration, it seems that he should be
allowed to enforce the instrument against such party according to its
altered terms rather than according to its original tenor."
Section 3-408. Consideration.
Want or failure of consideration is a defense as against any person
not having the rights of a holder in due course (Section 3-305), except
that no consideration is necessary for an instrument or obligation there-
85 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.16, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.56.
sSMich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.17, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.57.
8 7 See Weidman v. Symes, 120 Mich. 657, 79 N.W. 894 (1899); First State Savings
Bank v. Webster, 121 Mich. 149, 79 N.W. 1068 (1899); Simon v. Mittelman, 258 Mich.
266, 241 N.W. 816 (1932).
88 Italics added. See also §3-305(2).
89 It should be observed that the question of who may be a holder in due course of
such an instrument would be treated somewhat differently under the code than under
present Michigan law. See Bronson v. Stetson, 252 Mich. 6, 232 N.W. 741 (1930), and
§§3-302(2) and 3-304(5)(d).
90 Compare §3-407(2)(a). See Muskegon Citizens Loan & Investment Co. v. Chmn-
payne, 257 Mich. 427, 241 N.W. 135 (1932).
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on given in payment of or as security for an antecedent obligation of
any kind. 9
Since want or failure of consideration is now a defense against
persons other than holders in due course, holdings on this subject would
not be disturbed. However, the provision that "no consideration is
91 For the evolution of this provision, see Palmer, "Negotiable Instruments under the
Uniform Commercial Code," 48 MCH. L. Rnv. 255 at 288 (1950). Presumption of con-
sideration and burden of proof of the defense of want or failure of consideration are covered
by 53-307.92 Forbearance from assertion of claim as consideration: Rood v. Jones, 1 Doug.
188 (1843); Taylor v. Weeks, 129 Mich. 233, 88 N.W. 466 (1901) (claim invalid
because barred by statute of limitations); Thornton v. Danum, 120 Mich. 510, 79 N.W. 797
(1899) (claim invalid). See also Cawthorpe v. Clark, 173 Mich. 267, 138 N.W. 1075
(1912); Steep v. Harpham, 241 Mich. 652, 217 N.W. 787 (1928). Relinquishment of
dower as consideration: Kennedy v. Shaw, 43 Mich. 359, 5 N.W. 396 (1880). Note given
by father to son to cover son's share in father's estate as consideration: Conrad v. Manning's
Estate, 125 Mich. 77, 83 N.W. 1038 (1900). See also In re Barth's Estate, 301 Mich. 186,
3 N.W. (2d) 56 (1942). Worthless property as consideration: Miller v. Finley, 26 Mich.
249 (1872); McCabe v. Caner, 68 Mich. 182, 35 N.W. 901 (1888); Crampton v.
Newton's Estate, 132 Mich. 149, 93 N.W. 250 (1903). But see Newman and Snel's
State Bank v. Hunter, 243 Mich. 331, 220 N.W. 665 (1928) (worthless note not con-
sideration). Promises against public policy as consideration: Buck v. First Nat. Bank, 27
Mich. 293 (1873); Barden v. A. Heller Sawdust Co., 240 Mich. 549, 215 N.W. 364
(1927); Tinker v. Hurst, 70 Mich. 159, 38 N.W. 16 (1888); O'Hara v. Carpenter, 23
Mich. 410 (1871); East Side Trust & Savings Bank v. McGinnis, 197 Mich. 432, 163
N.W. 949 (1917); Hubbard v. Freiberger, 133 Mich. 139, 94 N.W. 727 (1903). Case
v. Smith, 107 Mich. 416, 65 N.W. 279 (1895); Comstock v. Draper, 1 Mich. 481
(1850); McNamara v. Gargett, 68 Mich. 454, 36 N.W. 218 (1888). Moral obligation
arising out of oral promise void under statute of frauds or barred by statute of limitations
as consideration: Bagaeff v. Prokopik, 212 Mich. 265, 180 N.W. 427 (1920), and Koons
v. Vauconsant, 129 Mich. 260, 88 N.W. 630 (1902) (dictum). Services as consideration:
In re Dunnigan's Estate, 282 Mich. 500, 276 N.W. 532 (1937); Garwood v. Burton,
265 Mich. 408, 251 N.W. 564 (1933). Promise of marrige as consideration where promi-
see dies before marriage: In re Roy's Estate, 278 Mich. 6, 270 N.W. 196 (1936). Settle-
ment of claims or controversies as consideration: Walton v. Mason, 109 Mich. 486, 67
N.W. 692 (1896); Barger v. Farnham, 130 Mich. 487, 90 N.W. 281 (1902); Young v.
Shepard's Estate, 124 Mich. 552, 83 N.W. 403 (1900); Gates v. Shutts, 7 Mich. 126
(1859). Novation: American Commercial Alcohol Corp. v. Don G. McAfee, Inc., 274
Mich. 689, 265 N.W. 504 (1936); Littshire Clothes, Inc. v. Detroit Hub Clothes, Inc.,
294 Mich. 661, 294 N.W. 69 (1940). Cf. Compton v. Blair, 27 Mich. 397 (1873).
Detrimental reliance: Farnsworth v. Fraser, 137 Mich. 296, 100 N.W. 400 (1904). Failure
of consideration: Gottesman v. Rheinfrank, 303 Mich. 153, 5 N.W. (2d) 701 (1942);
Perkins v. Brown, 115 Mich. 41, 72 N.W. 1095 (1897); Fink v. Chambers, 95 Mich.
508, 55 N.W. 375 (1893); Homer v. Townsend, 208 Mich. 612, 175 N.W. 385 (1920);
Sutton v. Beckwith, 68 Mich. 303, 36 N.W. 79 (1888); Green v. Ostrander, 160 Mich.
662, 125 N.W. 735 (1910); Maltz v. Fletcher, 52 Mich. 484, 18 N.W. 228 (1884);
Lanphere v. Ackles, 220 Mich. 300, 189 N.W. 845 (1922). Want of consideration (mis-
cellaneous): Roy v. Leonard, 340 Mich. 15, 64 N.W. (2d) 646 (1954); Smith v. Baubie,
256 Mich. 335, 239 N.W. 396 (1931); Nowack v. Lehmann, 139 Mich. 474, 102 N.W.
992 (1905); Graham v. Alexander, 123 Mich. 168, 81 N.W. 1084 (1900); Rickey v.
Morrison, 69 Mich. 139, 37 N.W. 56 (1888); Kelley v. Guy, 116 Mich. 43, 74 N.W.
291 (1898); Thorp v. Deming, 78 Mich. 124, 43 N.W. 1097 (1889).
Enforceability of married women's promises on negotiable instruments is sometimes
discussed in terms of consideration rather than coverture. For cases, see annotation follow-
ing Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §26.161.
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necessary for an instrument or obligation thereon given in payment of
or as security for an antecedent obligation of any kind" would work
some changes in Michigan law. If A, being indebted to B, gives his
note to pay or secure the debt, there is consideration for the note.9 3
Under the code, the finding of consideration would be unnecessary to
the result. If A, being indebted to B, induces C gratuitously to furnish
his (C's) note for use as collateral security for A's debt, apparently C's
note is without consideration and cannot be enforced against C by one
not a holder in due course. 4 Under the code, consideration would not
be necessary and C's note would be enforceable against him. If A is
indebted to B on a note which C is induced to sign gratuitously, either
as co-maker or indorser, after delivery of the note to B, C's promise is
not binding for want of consideration when the instrument is in the
hands of a person other than a holder in due course. 5 Under the code,
consideration would not be necessary and C's promise would be en-
forceable.
Section 3-409. Draft Not an Assignment.
(1) A check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assign-
ment of any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its payment,
and the drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts it.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect any liability in contract,
tort or otherwise arising from any letter of credit or other obligation or
representation which is not an acceptance.
Section 3-409(1) would combine sections 12796 and 18997 of the
NIL and restate the present provisions that a check or a bill does not, of
itself, operate as an assignment of the drawer's funds in the hands of
the drawee. An assignment of funds in the hands of a drawee could,
however, still be found from other facts in the transaction out of which
the instrument arose indicating an intention by the drawer to make an
9STraverse City Depositors' Corp. v. Case, 297 Mich. 304, 297 N.W. 501 (1941);
W. T. Rawleigh Co. v. Bowen, 308 Mich. 122, 13 N.W. (2d) 230 (1944).
9 4 See Brown v. Smedley, 136 Mich. 65, 98 N.W. 856 (1904). The courts generally
have disagreed on this question. West Rutland Trust Co. v. Houston, 104 Vt. 204, 158 A.
69 (1932) (consideration); Kiess v. Baldwin, (D.C. Cir. 1934) 74 F. (2d) 470 (no con-
sideration).
9 5 Manistee National Bank v. Seymour, 64 Mich. 59, 31 N.W. 140 (1887); Kulen-
kamp v. Groff, 71 Mich. 675, 40 N.W. 57 (1888). See also Steers v. Holmes, 79 Mich.
430, 44 N.W. 922 (1890).
96 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.129, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.169.
97Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.191, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.231.
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assignment. For example, the Michigan courts could still properly find
that where a draft is drawn for the exact amount of an account owing
by the drawee and the documentary evidence of the account is attached
to the draft, there is sufficient showing of drawer's intent to assign his
interests to the payee or holder of the instrument.98 It might also be
found that a check or draft plus peculiar circumstances in the transac-
tion justify impressing a trust on funds in the hands of the drawee for
the benefit of the payee or holder of the instrument. 9
Section 3-409 would eliminate a potentially confusing inconsist-
ency which now exists in the wording of sections 127 (relating to bills
of exchange) and 189 (relating to checks) of the NIL. Section 127
provides that the drawee is not liable "on the bill" until acceptance,
whereas section 189 provides that the drawee bank is not liable "to the
holder" until acceptance or certification. The possibility of confusion
is readily apparent. Was it intended that the drawee of a bill of ex-
change, while having no liability "on the bill" until acceptance, should
be subject to other forms of liability to the holder, e.g., in tort for con-
version, while the drawee of an uncertified check would be free from
liability "to the holder" on any theory? This difference in language
becomes important where an uncertified check bearing a forged in-
dorsement is paid by the drawee bank. Since the check has not been
certified, the drawee bank cannot be liable to the rightful holder on
the instrument. But is the drawee bank liable to the rightful holder in
tort for conversion? Arguably not, because the drawee bank is not
liable to the holder (apparently on any theory) until acceptance or
certification. 0 Section 3-409 would make it clear that there is no
intention to control liabilities of the drawee of bills and checks aside
98 Moore v. Davis, 57 Mich. 251, 23 N.W. 800 (1885).
99 Gillen v. Wakefield State Bank, 246 Mich. 158, 224 N.W. 761 (1929). Cf.
Reichert v. Midland Co. Say. Bank, 254 Mich. 551, 236 N.W. 859 (1931); Borgess
Hospital v. Union Industrial Trust and Say. Bank, 265 Mich. 156, 251 N.W. 363 (1933);
Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Emery, 292 Mich. 394, 290 N.W. 841 (1940). For an
excellent discussion of drawee's liability to holders of checks or drafts on theories of assign-
ment or trust, see Aigler, 'ights of Holder of Bill of Exchange against the Drawee," 38
HAnv. L. Rnv. 857 (1925).
100 The Ohio court, construing this provision, so held in Elyria Savings & Banking Co.
v. Walker Bin Co., 92 Ohio St. 406, 111 N.E. 147 (1915). Other courts in this situation
have ignored the precise language of the statute and have found the drawee bank liable
to the rightful holder on a theory of conversion. State v. First Nat. Bank of Albuquerque,
38 N.M. 225, 30 P. (2d) 728 (1934). In such jurisdictions should the holder of the check
be able to waive the tort and sue the drawee bank in assumpsit? See A. Paul Goddall Real
Estate & Ins. Co. v. North Birmingham American Bank, 225 Ala. 507, 144 S. 7 (1932).
For further discussion of the drawee bank's liability in these circumstances, see Aigler,
'Rights of Holder of Bill of Exchange against the Drawee," 38 HAnv. L. REy. 857 at 881
et seq. (1925).
1954]
192 MicmGAN LAw REvmw [Vol. 53
from the instrument itself. Sub-section (1) provides that the drawee
of a "check or other draft ... is not liable on the instrument until he
accepts it."'' Sub-section (2) provides that this section shall not affect
any liability in contract, tort or otherwise.
In Michigan, a drawee bank which pays an uncertified check bear-
ing a forged indorsement has no liability to the rightful holder on the
instrument itself,"0 2 nor in assumpsit °3 nor for conversion. °4 How-
ever, a cashing or collecting bank is liable to the rightful holder for
conversion0 5 and in assumpsit' °8 if it cashes or collects money on a
check bearing a forged indorsement 0 7 The drawee bank's freedom
from such liability is not, however, based on the peculiar language of
section 189 of the NIL precluding liability to the holder until accept-
ance or certification. If such were the basis of decision, a reexamination
of existing law on this point would be necessary under the code.
Instead, liability is denied because a check does not operate as an
assignment to the holder of the drawer's funds in the hands of the
drawee bank which would also be true under the code. 08 While sec-
tion 3409 would not affect the Michigan law in this regard, there
would be important changes worked by section 3-419, which is dis-
cussed later.
101 Italics added.
0 2 Brennan v. Merchants' and Manufacturers' Nat. Bank, 62 Mich. 343, 28 N.W.
881 (1886).
10 3 Lonier v. State Say. Bank, 149 Mich. 483, 112 N.W. 1119 (1907). But see
dictum in Dunnette v. Henry L. Doherty & Co., 252 Mich. 597 at 599, 233 N.W. 428
(1930). See also Weaver v. Detroit Bank, 330 Mich. 366, 47 N.W. (2d) 650 (1951),
where the court could have denied relief on the theory of the Lonier case but reached the
same result on a theory of election of remedies.
104 Gordon Fireworks Co. v. Capital Nat. Bank, 236 Mich. 271, 210 N.W. 263
(1926), criticized in 25 Mrc. L. Buv. 454 (1927). See also Corbett v. Kleinsmith, (6th
Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 511.
105 Kaufman v. State Say. Bank, 151 Mich. 65, 114 N.W. 863 (1908). See also
Lonier v. Ann Arbor Say. Bank, 153 Mich. 253, 116 N.W. 1088 (1908) and 162 Mich.
541, 127 N.W. 685 (1910), involving a conversion action by the payee against a bank
which had discounted a note bearing a forged indorsement.
106 Brown v. People's Nat. Bank, 170 Mich. 416, 136 N.W. 506 (1912), in which
recovery was denied, however, because the holder's delay in notifying the cashing bank of
the forgery had resulted in injury to the bank. See also National Production Co. v.
Guardian Nat. Bank of Commerce, 281 Mich. 230, 274 N.W. 774 (1937), involving
cashing of checks bearing unauthorized indorsements, where the rightful owner was denied




7 On principle, if the action of the cashing or collecting bank amounts to conversion,
it would seem that payment by the drawee bank should make it a converter too. In both
cases, the holder's enjoyment of his property, i.e., the instrument, is equally interfered with.
108 It is difficult to see what bearing assignment of funds has on the question of the
drawee bank's liability in tort for destruction of the rightful holder's property, i.e., the
check, through its act of paying and cancelling the check.
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Section 3-410. Definition and Operation of Acceptance.
(1) Acceptance is the drawee's signed engagement to honor the
draft as presented. It must be written on the draft, and may consist
of his signature alone. It becomes operative when completed by
delivery or notification.
(2) A draft may be accepted although it has not been signed by
the drawer or is otherwise incomplete or is overdue or has been dis-
honored.
(3) Where the draft is payable at a fixed period after sight and
the acceptor fails to date his acceptance the holder may complete it by
supplying a date in good faith.
Under the code, the subject of acceptance of drafts would be
greatly simplified. The outmoded subject of acceptance for honor'0 9
is completely eliminated. Extrinsic'" and virtual"' acceptances are
likewise eliminated." 2  Confusion over the problem of constructive
acceptances" 3 should be ended. For example, drawee's delay or
refusal to return an instrument presented for acceptance or payment
should no longer constitute acceptance.114 However, if the drawee
refuses to return the instrument on demand when it is delivered for
acceptance or to pay or return the instrument when it is delivered for
payment, the drawee will be liable for conversion of the instrument." 5
The measure of damages for the conversion by the drawee is fixed at
the face amount of the instrument.
116
In short, under the code, acceptance must be "written on the draft"
to be effective. It is the drawee's "signed engagement to honor the
draft as presented." Section 3-417 gives the drawee-acceptor recourse
by action on warranty if the instrument was altered before acceptance.
109 Now covered by NIL, §§161-170 [Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§439.163-439.172,
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §§19.203-19.212].
110NIL, §134 [Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.136, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937)
§19.176].
11"NIL, §135 [Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.137, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937)
§19.177]. See Bissell v. Lewis, 4 Mich. 450 (1857); Wilson & Co. v. Niffenegger, 211
Mich. 311, 178 N.W. 667 (1920).
112 Note, however, that under §3-409(2), a drawee, while not liable as acceptor, may
be otherwise liable as a result of a writing which might, under present law, constitute
an extrinsic or virtual acceptance of the instrument itself.
nraNIL, §137 [Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.139, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937)
§19.179]. As to the problem of constructive acceptances under the NIL, see Feezer, "Ac-
ceptance of Bills of Exchange by Conduct," 12 Mmx. L. Rnv. 129 (1928).





It "may consist of his [drawee's] signature alone""" and "becomes
operative when completed by delivery or notification."
Sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 3-410 cover the area now
encompassed by section 1381 of the NIL. Observe the change worked
by sub-section (3) which would allow the holder of a sight draft bear-
ing an undated acceptance to supply the date of presentment for accept-
ance if done in good faith.
Section 3-411. Certification of a Check.
(1) Certification of a check is acceptance. Where a holder
procures certification the drawer and all prior indorsers are discharged.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed a bank has no obligation to certify
a check.
(3) A bank may certify a check before returning it for lack of
proper indorsement. If it does so the drawer is discharged.
Section 3-411(1) leaves unchanged the provisions of sections 187
and 188.. of the NIL which provide that certification is acceptance
and that where the holder procures certification, the drawer and all prior
indorsers are discharged. 20  Section 3-411(2) recognizes the rule that,
unless otherwise agreed, a bank has no obligation to certify a check.
Section 3-411(3) recognizes the banking practice of certifying a check
which is returned for proper indorsement in order to protect the
drawer against a longer contingent liability.
Section 3-412. Acceptance Varying Draft.
(1) Where the drawee's proffered acceptance in any manner
varies the draft as presented the holder may refuse the acceptance and
treat the draft as dishonored in which case the drawee is entitled to
have his acceptance cancelled.
(2) Where the holder assents to such an acceptance each drawer,
and indorser who does not affirmatively assent is discharged except
where the variance is that payment shall be made only at a particular
place.
117 Accord, Peterson v. Hubbard, 28 Mich. 197 (1873).
118Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.140, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.180.
119 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§439.189 and 439.190, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937)
§§19.229 and 19.230.
12 0 Accord, First Nat. Bank of Detroit v. Currie, 147 Mich. 72, 110 N.W. 499
(1907). Of course certification at the request of the drawer will not discharge the drawer
or indorsers. Railway Express Agency v. Thomas, (D.C. Mich. 1933) 5 F. Supp. 345.
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(3) The terms of the draft are not varied by an acceptance to pay
at any bank in the continental United States.
Sections 139 through 142 of the NIL' 2' relating to qualified
acceptances are embodied in section 3-412 with some slight changes
better adapted to present commercial practices. If the acceptance
varies the terms of the draft, the holder, as under present law, may
refuse the acceptance and treat the draft as dishonored. If, however,
the holder assents to such acceptance each drawer and indorser who
does not affirmatively assent 22 is discharged except where the variance
is that payment shall be made only at a particular place. However,
the terms of the draft are not varied by an acceptance to pay at any
bank in the continental United States. For example, where a drawee
accepts "payable only at the law offices of A in Detroit, Michigan,"
this is a variance which the holder could treat as dishonor. If the
holder assents to this variance, however, the drawer and indorsers will
not be discharged regardless of whether they affirmatively assent.
But if the drawee accepts "payable only at X Bank in Detroit, Mich-
igan," there is no variance at all.' 23
Section 3-413. Contract of Maker, Drawer and Acceptor.
(1) The maker or acceptor engages that he will pay the instru-
ment according to its tenor at the time of his engagement.
(2) The drawer engages that upon dishonor of the draft and any
necessary notice of dishonor or protest he will pay the amount of the
draft to the holder or to any indorser who takes it up. The drawer may
disclaim this liability by drawing without recourse.
(3) By making, drawing or accepting the party admits as against
all subsequent parties including the drawee the existence of the payee
and his then capacity to indorse.
This section does little more than combine and reword sections 60,
61 and 622 of the NIL. The maker or acceptor incurs a primary
liability 25 to pay the note "according to its tenor at the time of his
121 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§439.141-439.144, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §§19.181-
19.184.
12 2 Eliminates the present possibility of mere failure to object within a reasonable
time preventing a discharge. See NIL, §144 [Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.146, Mich.
Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.186].
1
2 3 See also §3-504(4).
'2 4 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) § §439.62, 439.63 and 439.64, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937)
§§19.102, 19.103 and 19.104.
125 Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Pine Ridge Coal Co., 255 Mich. 295, 238 N.W. 261
(1931).
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engagement." The quoted phrase should clear up the present conflict
as to whether a draft, altered before acceptance, is accepted according
to its altered terms or according to its original tenor."2 6 The warranties
made upon obtaining acceptance or payment (section 3-417) should
be consulted in conjunction with this engagement of the maker or
acceptor. The drawer engages that he will be secondarily liable for
"the amount of the draft."'127
The maker, acceptor and drawer admit the existence of the payee
and his then capacity to indorse as to all subsequent parties "including
the drawee." Thus the drawee clearly gets the benefit of this
admission in cases of fictitious payees, infants, incompetents, ultra
vires corporate acts, etc.128 The acceptor's admission in section 62129 of
the NIL of the "existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature
and his capacity and authority to draw the instrument' is eliminated
in the code. The problem is dealt with In section 3-418.
Section 3-414. Contract of Indorser; Order of Liability.
(1) Unless the indorsement otherwise specifies (as by such words
as "without recourse") every indorser engages that upon dishonor and
any necessary notice of dishonor and protest he will pay the instrument
according to its tenor at the time of his indorsement to the holder or to
any subsequent indorser who takes it up, even though the indorser
-who takes it up was not obligated to do so.
(2) Unless they otherwise agree indorsers are liable to one another
in the order in which they indorse, which is presumed to be the order
in which their signatures appear on the instrument.
The code eliminates reference to "qualified indorsements" as
such' 30 but recognizes that an indorsement may specify contractual
obligations which are different from the usual engagement of the
126 See Greeley, 'The Effect of Acceptance of an Altered Bill," 27 ILL. L. Rev. 519
(1933).
127 Of course, the engagements of the maker, acceptor and drawer must be read in
connection with the sections, on incomplete instruments (§3-115), negligence contributing
to alteration or unauthorized signature (§3406), alteration (§3-407), acceptances varying
a draft (§3412) and finality of payment or acceptance (§3-418).
128 For cases dealing with the maker's admission of the existence of the payee, see
Neyens v. Worthington, 150 Mich. 580, 114 N.W. 404 (1908); Pontiac Say. Bank v.
Reinforced Concrete Pipe Co., 178 Mich. 261, 144 N.W. 486 (1913); Peoples State Bank
v. Trombly, 241 Mich. 199, 217 N.W. 47 (1928); Lincoln Investment Co. v. Metros, 257
Mich. 215, 241 N.W. 166 (1932).
M Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.64, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.104.
IS0 NIL, §38 [Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.40, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.80].
The provision that a qualified indorsement "does not impair the negotiable character of the
instrument" is covered by §3-202(4) of the code.
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indorser. When the indorsement specifies that it is "without recourse"
there is no doubt that the indorser refuses to assume any responsibility
for ultimate payment of the instrument. But where the words
accompanying the indorsement are less explicit, there may be difficulty.
In Michigan, an indorsement which "assigns all right, title and interest"
in an instrument is a qualified indorsement.' However, an indorse-
ment which simply "assigns" the instrument is a general indorse-
ment." 2 Such tenuous distinctions would still be possible under the
code for the courts could hold that in the former situation the indorser
"otherwise specifies" his intentions whereas in the latter situation he
does not. Section 443 of the NIL, permitting a representative to in-
dorse in such terms as to negative personal liability, would be covered
under the code by the right of the indorser to "otherwise specify" his
intentions.'34
The code would change the engagement of the indorser slightly.
Consistent with section 3-413, the indorser would engage to pay the
instrument "according to its tenor at the time of his indorsement."
Under section 66""5 of the NIL the indorser simply engages to pay "ac-
cording to its tenor." Hence an indorser of an instrument after altera-
tion would clearly be liable on the instrument as altered. Also, the
indorser would be liable to any subsequent indorser who takes it up
"even though the indorser who takes it up was not obligated to do so"
whereas under section 66 he is liable only to any subsequent indorser
"who may be compelled to pay it."
Under the code, every indorser makes an engagement or contract
of secondary liability unless the indorsement otherwise specifies. Use
of parol evidence to vary the terms of the indorser's contract is thus
prohibited. This is in accord with Michigan law. 36
I' Fecko v. Tarczynski, 281 Mich. 590, 275 N.W. 502 (1937). This is definitely
the minority view. 36 MzcH. L. Rrv. 483 (1938). Earlier cases in Michigan seem to hold
that use of such words does not even constitute an indorsement. Aniba v. Yeomans, 39
Mich. 171 (1878); Gale v. Mayhew, 161 Mich. 96, 125 N.W. 781 (1910). Compare
Stevens v. Hannan, 86 Mich. 305, 48 N.W. 951 (1891). See §3-202(4).
1
3 2 Markey v. Corey, 108 Mich. 184, 66 N.W. 493 (1895).
133 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.46, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.86.
134 See also §3-403; Cooper v. Sonk, 201 Mich. 655, 167 N.W. 842 (1918).
135 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.68, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.108. For
cases dealing with the indorsers engagement see H. H. Dickinson Co. v. Hickey, 235 Mich.
638, 209 N.W. 848 (1926); McPherson v. Evart State Bank, 239 Mich. 670, 214 N.W.
971 (1927). See also Rogers v. Detroit Say. Bank, 146 Mich. 639, 110 N.W. 74 (1906).
136 Ortmann v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, 39 Mich. 518 (1878); Holland City
State Bank v. Meeuwsen, 192 Mich. 326, 158 N.W. 1032 (1916); Nimmo v. Supernaw,
279 Mich. 126, 271 N.W. 705 (1937); Hitchcock v. Frackelton, 116 Mich. 487, 74 N.W.
720 (1898).
However, as might be expected in this area, there is some equivocal indication to the
contrary. In Blackwood v. Sakwinski, 221 Mich. 464, 191 N.W. 207 (1922), the court
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By providing that every indorser assumes a secondary liability on
the instrument (unless otherwise specified), the code incorporates the
essence of section 67'37 of the NIL which provides that where "a person
places his indorsement on an instrument negotiable by delivery he
incurs all the liabilities of an indorser."
The code provision relating to order of liability of indorsers (sec-
tion 3-414(2) ) seems to be in harmony with existing Michigan law.1"8
Section 3-415. Contract of Accommodation Party.
(1) An accommodation party is one who signs the instrument in
any capacity as surety for another party to it.
(2) When the instrument has been taken for value before it is
due the accommodation party is liable in the capacity in which he has
signed even though the taker knows of the accommodation.
(3) As against a holder in due course and without notice of the
accommodation oral proof of the accommodation is not admissible to
give the accommodation party the benefit of discharges dependent on
his character as such. In other cases the accommodation character may
be shown by oral proof.
(4) An indorsement which shows it is not in the chain of title
is notice of its accommodation character.
(5) An accommodation party is not liable to the party accom-
modated, and if he pays the instrument has a right of recourse on the
instrument against such party.
Section 3-415(1) defines "accommodation party." The term in-
cludes one who signs an instrument "in any capacity," whether as
maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser. This is in accord with section
held that since the agreement for transfer of the mortgage provided that the assignor
should merely pass title, the general endorsement of the note secured by the mortgage must
be treated as a qualified indorsement. In the two opinions of the court in Auto Purchase
Corp. v. Johnston, 319 Mich. 634, 30 N.W. (2d) 379 (1948) and 324 Mich. 445, 37
N.W. (2d) 167 (1949), it is not clear whether the court held that parol evidence was
admissible to vary the terms of the general indorser's contract or to show that the indorser's
contract was induced by fraud. The fact that the court cites Shaw v. Stein, 79 Mich. 77,
44 N.W. 419 (1889), as authority in the second opinion indicates that the parol evidence
was admissible only to show fraud, which would be perfectly proper.
' 8 7Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.69, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.109.
' 3 8 See NIL, §68 [Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.70, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937)
§19.110]; Blom v. McBride, 292 Mich. 153, 289 N.W. 203 (1940); Harrah v. Doherty,
111 Mich. 175, 69 N.W. 242 (1896); McGurk v. Huggett, 56 Mich. 187, 22 N.W. 308
(1885); Greusel v. Hubbard, 51 Mich. 95, 16 N.W. 248 (1883); Sweet v. Woodin, 72
Mich. 393, 40 N.W. 471 (1888); Brewer v. Boynton, 71 Mich. 254, 39 N.W. 49 (1888).
Cf. Shufelt v. Moore, 93 Mich. 564, 53 N.W. 722 (1892); First Nat. Bank of Ludington
v. Michigan-Arkansas Oil Corp., 231 Mich. 597, 204 N.W. 719 (1925).
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2939 of the NIL. The signature must be placed on the instrument "as
surety 4 . for another party to it." Reference to the accommodation
party as a surety is simply a frank recognition of what has generally
been regarded as the status of an accommodation party in relation to
the party accommodated."4' It has the virtue of eliminating the
requirement of section 29 that the accommodation party must sign the
instrument "without receiving value therefor." Why shouldn't it be
possible for an accommodation party to receive compensation for the
risks he assumes just as other sureties?.42 The accommodation party
must also sign as surety for another party to the instrument. Under
section 29 the accommodation party must sign the instrument for the
purpose of lending his name to "some other person." The code require-
ment that the person accommodated be a party to the instrument is
new.
1 43
Section 3-415(2) attempts to eliminate some conflicts which
existed at common law and which have persisted under the NIL. The
last sentence of section 29 provides that an accommodation party "is
liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding such
holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an
accommodation party." A few courts have construed this language
to mean that an accommodation party can assert the defense of lack
of consideration against any holder except a holder in due course.' 44
Such a result does violence to the language of section 29 and should
not be possible under the language of section 3-415(2). The courts
have also disagreed on whether the accommodation party is liable on
an instrument which is not negotiated for value until after it is due. 45
By providing that the accommodation party is liable when the instru-
ISO Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.31, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.71.
140 Sec. 1-201(40) provides that "surety" includes "guarantor."
141 See, for example, Barron v. Cady, 40 Mich. 259 (1879); Warner v. Fallon Coal
Mines, 246 Mich. 493, 224 N.W. 601 (1929).
142 See Warner v. Fallon Coal Mines, 246 Mich. 493 at 497, 224 N.W. 601 (1929).
14 3 See BIGELow, BLL~s, NoaTs Asm CHnEcKs, 3d ed., §442(a). In the following
cases the person accommodated was apparently not a party to the instrument: Irwin v.
Wolcott, 183 Mich. 92, 149 N.W. 1035 (1914); Columbia Motor Truck & Trailer Co.
v. Bamlet, 227 Mich. 651, 199 N.W. 612 (1924); Warner v. Fallon Coal Mines Co., 246
Mich. 493, 224 N.W. 601 (1929). Cf. Palmer Nat. Bank v. Van Doren, 260 Mich. 310,
244 N.W. 485 (1932); Albrecht v. Pfeiffer, 298 Mich. 721, 299 N.W. 780 (1941).
144 Frank L. Dittmeier Real Estate Co. v. Knox, (Mo. App. 1924) 259 S.W. 835;
Pacific Southwest Trust & Say. Bank v. Valley Finance Corp., 99 Cal. App. 728, 279 P.
222 (1929). On several occasions the Michigan courts have come dangerously close to
this result. Columbia Motor Truck & Trailer Co. v. Bamlet, 227 Mich. 651, 199 N.W.
612 (1924); Krause v. Retty, 254 Mich. 684, 236 N.W. 906 (1931).
145 Liability: Altfillisch v. McCarty, 49 S.D. 203, 207 N.W. 67 (1926). No liability:
Rylee v. Wilkerson, 134 Miss. 663, 99 S. 901 (1924). See Warder, Bushnell & Glessner
Co. v. Gibbs, 92 Mich. 29, 52 N.W. 73 (1892), which was decided before the NIL.
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ment "has been taken for value before it is due," the code should
resolve this conflict.
Under section 3-415(2), the accommodation party would be
"liable in the capacity in which he has signed even though the taker
knows of the accommodation."' 46 This is substantially in accord with
Michigan law. If, for example, he signed as accommodation indorser,
he normally would be liable only after presentment, notice of dis-
honor and protest.'47 If the taker of accommodation paper were not
a holder in due course, he would take subject to defenses good as
against holders not in due course except for the defense of want of
consideration. 4 ' Under the code, as now, such taker would be
subject to the defenses of discharge by extension of time to the
principal debtor without the consent of the accommodation party
where the accommodation relationship was known to the taker,"' 9 con-
ditions and collateral agreements regarding the paper which are known
to the taker"tio and material diversion with knowledge of the taker.' 51
Absent agreement as to application of security, the accommodation
party would not be discharged because the taker applied the security to
other debts of the accommodated party.'52 Failure of the taker to enforce
the instrument against the accommodated party as requested by the
accommodation party would not be a defense."'a Where the accommo-
dation signature was induced by fraud, knowledge of the accommoda-
tion would not be enough-taker must have notice of the fraud. 5 4 If
146 Knowledge of the accommodation also makes no difference under NIL, §29.
Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Pine Ridge Coal Co., 255 Mich. 295, 238 N.W. 261 (1931).
See also Thatcher v. West River Nat. Bank of Jamaica, Vermont, 19 Mich. 196 (1869).
147 See Home Say. Bank v. Refior, 289 Mich. 426, 286 N.W. 669 (1939).
148 As to the rights of one not a holder in due course, see §3-306.
149 Barron v. Cady, 40 Mich. 259 (1879); Stevens v. Oaks, 58 Mich. 343, 25 N.W.
309 (1885); Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Hupp, 211 Mich. 698, 179 N.W. 286
(1920); Gano v. Heath, 36 Mich. 441 (1877) (accommodation not known to taker). See
also Morse v. Blanchard, 117 Mich. 37, 75 N.W. 93 (1898); Hitchcock v. Frackelton, 116
Mich. 487, 74 N.W. 720 (1898). Sections 3-603, 3-604 and 3-606 relate to problems of
discharge of accommodation parties.
150 J. A. Fay & Co. v. James Jenks & Co., 93 Mich. 130, 53 N.W. 163 (1892); Clare
County Say. Bank v. Featherly, 173 Mich. 292, 139 N.W. 61 (1912); Holland City
State Bank v. Ahdawagam Furniture Co., 226 Mich. 653, 198 N.W. 202 (1924) (defense
not good because condition not known to taker); First Nat. Bank of Ypsilanti v. Apex
Motor Corp., 227 Mich. 374, 198 N.W. 925 (1924) (defense not good because condition
not known to taker).
'5' Warner v. Fallon Coal Mines Co., 246 Mich. 493, 224 N.W. 601 (1929); Gobles
Co-operative Assn. v. Albright, 248 Mich. 68, 226 N.W. 876 (1929); Holland City State
Bank v. Ahdawagam Furniture Co., 226 Mich. 653, 198 N.W. 202 (1924) (defense not
good because diversion not known to taker).
152Noble v. Murphy, 91 Mich. 653, 52 N.W. 148 (1892). See also §§9-207 and
9-501 et seq. which deal with application of security under the code.
153 Inkster v. First Nat. Bank of Marshall, 30 Mich. 143 (1874).
154 Cristy v. Campan, 107 Mich. 172, 65 N.W. 12 (1895).
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the taker of accommodation paver were a holder in due course with
notice of the accommodation, he would take free of those defenses
which normally cannot be asserted against a holder in due course 55
but would be subject to any defenses of the accommodation party based
upon the fact that he is a surety, e.g., extension of time to principal
debtor without consent of surety. This is implicit in sub-sections
3-415(2) and (3). If the taker of accommodation paper were a holder
in due course without notice of the accommodation, he would even
take free of suretyship defenses of the accommodation party'
58
As against any taker except a holder in due course without notice
of the accommodation, parol evidence would be admissible to show the
accommodation character of the signer of the instrument. This is in
substantial accord with the Michigan law.'57 At this point passing
reference should be made to the difference between admission of parol
evidence to show the accommodation relationship (which is proper,
as indicated above), admission of parol evidence to show conditional
delivery or delivery for a specified purpose by the accommodation
party (which may be proper) 58 and admission of parol evidence to vary
the engagement of the accommodation party in the capacity in which
he signed (which is improper). 59
Section 3-415(4) is a new provision which makes an indorsement
that shows it is not in the chain of tide notice of its accommodation
character."' 0
Section 3-415(5) provides that an "accommodation party is not
liable to the party accommodated,"' 61 which is in line with Michigan
155 As to the rights of a holder in due course, see §3-305. See Armstrong v. Stearns,
156 Mich. 597, 121 N.W. 312 (1909).
156 Sec. 3-415(3). See Stevens v. McLachlan, 120 Mich. 285, 79 N.W. 627 (1899).
157 Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Coumbe, 47 Mich. 358, 11 N.W. 196 (1882);
Stevens v. Oaks, 58 Mich. 343, 25 N.W. 309 (1885); Hitchcock v. Frackelton, 116 Mich.
487, 74 N.W. 720 (1898); Lamberson v. Love, 165 Mich. 460, 130 N.W. 1126 (1911).
See also Colbath v. Jones, 28 Mich. 280 (1873).
158 Clare County Say. Bank v. Featherly, 173 Mich. 292, 139 N.W. 61 (1912). See
also Taylor v. Rugenstein, 245 Mich. 152, 222 N.W. 107 (1928).
159 Kulenkamp v. Groff, 71 Mich. 675, 40 N.W. 57 (1888); Aultman & Taylor Co.
v. Gorham, 87 Mich. 233, 49 N.W. 486 (1891); Gumz v. Giegling, 108 Mich. 295, 66
N.W. 48 (1896); Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Pine Ridge Coal Co., 255 Mich. 295, 238
N.W. 261 (1931). See also In re Dosker's Estate, 284 Mich. 597, 280 N.W. 61 (1938).
160See Moynahan v. Hanaford, 42 Mich. 329, 3 N.W. 944 (1879). See also
§3-416(4) which creates a presumption of accommodation where words of guaranty are
added to the signature of one of two or more makers or acceptors.
161 This provision plus the provision that the accommodation party is liable on the
instrument in the capacity in which he signed would make it possible to eliminate the




law.16 2  It further provides that if an accommodation party pays the
instrument, he has a right of recourse on the instrument against the
accommodated party. This would reject decisions under section 121163
of the NIL which hold that an anomalous indorser who pays the instru-
ment cannot maintain an action on the instrument against the accom-
modated party since he has no "former rights" to which he can be re-
mitted.Y64 Apparently the Michigan courts have not decided this ques-
tion since adoption of the NIL.165
Notice that the accommodation party's right of recourse on the
instrument under section 3-415(5) is limited to the accommodated
party. Suppose an anomalous indorser who signed for the accommoda-
tion of the payee pays the instrument and now desires recourse on the
instrument against the maker instead of the accommodated payee. He
should succeed but the way is devious. Under section 3-603(2), pay-
ment of an instrument may be made "by any person, including a
stranger to the instrument." Certainly this includes the anomalous
indorser. Upon such payment, surrender of the instrument to such
indorser "gives him the rights of a transferee." Section 3-201(1) vests
in the transferee, with certain exceptions, such rights as his transferor
had in the instrument. His right to recourse against the maker of the
instrument would thus depend on the rights of the holder to whom
payment was made.' 66 As a reacquirer of the instrument under section
3-208, his right of recourse would be limited to prior parties on the
instrument, i.e., the payee or maker. Also, as a reacquirer he could,
of course, reissue or further negotiate the instrument if he chose.
Section 3-416. Contract of Guarantor.
(1) "Payment guaranteed" or equivalent words added to a signa-
ture mean that the signer engages that if the instrument is not raid
162Runciman v. Brown, 223 Mich. 298, 193 N.W. 880 (1923); Lamberson v. Love,
165 Mich. 460, 130 N.W. 1126 (1911); Devereaux v. Estate of Phillips, 97 Mich. 104,
56 N.W. 228 (1893). See also Colbath v. Jones, 28 Mich. 280 (1873).
lOSMich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.123, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.163.
164 Quimby v. Varnum, 190 Mass. 211, 76 N.E. 671 (1906). But see Lin v. Gleason,
92 Kan. 754, 142 P. 287 (1914).
165 For cases decided at common law, see Hanish v. Kennedy, 106 Mich. 455, 64
N.W. 459 (1895); Bliss v. Estate of Plummer, 103 Mich. 181, 61 N.W. 263 (1894);
Tredway v. Antisdell, 86 Mich. 82, 48 N.W. 956 (1891); Alderton v. Williams, 130 Mich.
626, 90 N.W. 661 (1902); McClatchie v. Durham, 44 Mich. 435, 7 N.W. 76 (1880).
Of course, the accommodation party who pays may recover from the accommodated
party on grounds wholly aside from the instrument, e.g., exoneration. See Schram v.
Spivack, (D.C. Mich. 1946) 68 F. Supp. 451.
166 See Beckwith v. Webber, 78 Mich. 390, 44 N.W. 330 (1889).
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when due he will pay it according to its tenor without resort by the
holder to any other party.
(2) "Collection guaranteed" or equivalent words added to a
signature mean that the signer engages that if the instrument is not
paid when due he will pay it according to its tenor, but only after the
holder has reduced his claim against the maker or acceptor to judgment
and execution has been returned unsatisfied, or after the maker or
acceptor has become insolvent or it is otherwise apparent that it is use-
less to proceed against him.
(3) Words of guaranty which do not otherwise specify guarantee
payment.
(4) No words of guaranty added to the signature of a sole maker
or acceptor affect his liability on the instrument. Such words added
to the signature of one of two or more makers or acceptors create a
presumption that the signature is for the accommodation of the others.
(5) When words of guaranty are used presentment, notice of
dishonor and protest are not necessary to charge the user.
(6) Any guaranty written on the instrument is enforcible not-
withstanding any statute of frauds.
The NIL contains no provision relating to the liability of persons
who sign negotiable instruments as guarantors. The code treats such
signers as parties to the instrument and spells out their liability on the
instrument in terms of prevailing understanding as to the meaning and
effect of words of guaranty added to signatures on negotiable instru-
ments.
Under section 3-416(1), demand upon the maker or drawee is
unnecessary to hold an indorser who guarantees payment. Such an
indorser waives presentment, notice of dishonor and protest (3-416(5)).
Liability of such indorser is indistinguishable from that of a co-maker.
This coincides generally with Michigan law.'
Under section 3-416(2), the guarantor of collection is liable on the
instrument only after the holder "has reduced his claim against the
maker or acceptor to judgment and execution has been returned un-
satisfied, or after the maker or acceptor has become insolvent or it is
otherwise apparent that it is useless to proceed against him." This
provision also is generally in accord with Michigan law. 68
1
6  National Security & Trust Co. v. Niles Invisible Door Check Co., 222 Mich. 510,
193 N.W. 199 (1923). Cf. Tinker & Webb v. McCauley, 3 Mich. 188 (1854).
16SAldrich v. Chubb, 35 Mich. 350 (1877); Barman v. Carhartt, 10 Mich. 338
(1862); Thomas v. Dodge, 8 Mich. 51 C1860).
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In Michigan, a guaranty of payment or collection written on a
negotiable instrument is not within the statute of frauds 69 so section
3-416(6) would work no change in existing law.
Section 3-417. Warranties on Presentment and Transfer.
(1), Unless otherwise agreed any person who obtains payment or
acceptance and any prior transferor warrants to a party who pays or
accepts in good faith
(a) that he has a good title to the instrument or is author-
ized to obtain payment or acceptance on behalf of one
who has a good title; and
(1) that he has no knowledge or [of?] any effective direction
to stop payment; and
(c) that the instrument has not been materially altered, and
that he has no knowledge that the signature of the
maker or drawer is unauthorized, except that such
warranties are not given by a holder in due course who
has taken a draft drawn on and accepted by a bank
after such alteration or signature or by a holder in due
course of a note. This exception applies even though
a draft has been accepted "payable as originally drawn'
or in equivalent terms.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed any party who transfers an instru-
ment for consideration warrants to his transferee and if the transfer
is by indorsement to any subsequent holder who takes the instrument in
good faith that
(a) all signatures are genuine or authorized; and
(b) the instrument has not been materially altered; and
(c) the transfer is rightful; and
(d) no defense of any party is good against him; and
(e) he has no knowledge of any insolvency proceeding
instituted with respect to the maker or acceptor or the
drawer of an unaccepted instrument.
(3) By transferring "without recourse" the transferor limits the
obligation stated in subsection (2) (d) to a warranty that he has no
knowledge of such a defense.
(4) A selling agent or broker who does not disclose the fact that
he is acting only as such gives the warranties provided in this section,
169Jones v. Palmer, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 379 (1844); Thomas v. Dodge, 8 Mich. 51
(1860).
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but if he makes such disclosure warrants only his good faith and
authority.
Warranties on presentment (section 3-417(1)) work hand in
glove with the provision regarding finality of payment or acceptance
(section 3-418) and will, therefore, be discussed in connection with
the latter section.
Section 3-417, sub-sections (2), (3) and (4), deal with warranties
of vendors of negotiable instruments. It should clear up a number of
uncertainties which exist under sections 65170 and 66171 of the NIL.
Only a person "who transfers an instrument" is a warrantor thus
eliminating possible warranty liability of accommodation indorsers
under the NIL.172 Only transfers "for consideration" are included
which limits the warranties to transactions involving sales of interests
in instruments."' The warranties of an unqualified indorser run
to "any subsequent holder who takes the instrument in good faith
174
rather than to "all subsequent holders in due course" as under NIL,
section 66. Presumably the "transferee" who takes by delivery must
also have taken in good faith to benefit from the warranties. The
language of the code, however, leaves the door open to argument by
simply referring to "transferee" in one instance and "holder who takes
the instrument in good faith" in the other. This problem could be
obviated by judicious use of punctuation.
In stating the warranties, the code has avoided the confusing com-
mon law language which was used in sections 65 and 66 of the NIL.
The warranty that signatures are "genuine or authorized" covers only sit-
uations where the signature of the drawer or maker is forged or made
170 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.67, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.107.
171Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.68, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.108.
172 Under NIL, §66, "every indorser who indorses without qualification" is a war-
rantor. Presumably this includes irregular indorsers, e.g., accommodation parties, who have
nothing to do with sale and transfer of the instrument.
173 The warranties of NIL, §§65 and 66 are not clearly limited to transactions involv-
ing the sale of instruments. The warranties of NIL, §65 are operative against every person
"negotiating!' an instrument. "Negotiation" is defined in NIL, §30 [Mich. Comp. Laws
(1948) §439.32, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.72] as transfer of an instrument "from one
person to another in such manner as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof."
"Holder" is defined in NIL, §191 [Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.2, Mich. Stat. Ann.
(1937) §19.42] as "the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or
the bearer thereof." Nowhere is there any requirement that value be given. Arguably,
then, a donee of an instrument transferred by delivery or qualified indorsement could
assert the warranties against his donor. A similar result can be reached under the language
of NIL, §66.




without authority.'17 The warranty against material alteration is
separately and simply stated. 7 Warranty of title is covered by the
warranty that "the transfer is rightful."'1 7  This warranty would also
include the agent who transfers by delivery without authority. All
other defenses to the instrument whether real or personal are covered
by the warranty that "no defense of any party is good" against the trans-
feror. Note that the transferor who transfers "without recourse" war-
rants only that he has "no knowledge" of any such defense, which is
similar to section 65(4) of the NIL. Observe, however, that under the
NIL the transferor by delivery automatically gets the advantages of the
"no knowledge" limitation of section 65(4) whereas, under the code, he
has this advantage only if he enters into an agreement with the trans-
feree that the transfer is without recourse. A solution to the confusing
problem under the NIL as to whether there is a warranty of solvency
or collectibility of the maker, drawer or acceptor is attempted by the
code. The transferor warrants that "he has no knowledge of any in-
solvency proceeding 78 instituted with respect to the maker or acceptor
or the drawer of an unaccepted instrument."
The warranty provision as to selling agents or brokers (section
3-417(4)) replaces section 69179 of the NIL.
Section 3-418. Finality of Payment or Acceptance.
Except for recovery of bank payments as provided in the Article on
Bank Deposits and Collections (Article 4) and except for liability for
breach of warranty on presentment under the preceding section, pay-
ment or acceptance of any instrument is final in favor of a holder in
due course.
This section provides in sweeping terms that "payment or accept-
ance of any instrument is final in favor of a holder in due course."
Such a provision would mean that there could be no recovery against
a holder in due course where there was payment made or acceptance
175 "Genuine" is defined by §1-201(18) as "free of forgery or counterfeiting." "Au-
thorized" is not defined. However, "unauthorized signature" is defined in §1-201(43) as
"a signature made without actual, implied or apparent authority and includes a forgery."
176 Under the NIL, material alteration falls under the warranty of genuineness.
177 See Nat. Bank of Detroit v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 291 Mich. 36,
288 N.W. 325 (1939); Fish v. First Nat. Bank of Detroit, 42 Mich. 203, 3 N.W. 849
(1879).
178 "Insolvency proceeding" is defined in § 1-201(22) as including "any assignment
for the benefit of creditors or other proceedings intended to liquidate or rehabilitate the
estate of the person involved."
1'79Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.71, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.111.
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given by mistake-on an instrument bearing a forged signature of the
drawer, a forged indorsement or an alteration of its material terms.
This would represent a drastic departure from existing concepts of
recovery in this area. However, no such radical changes were intended,
for this provision is subject to certain exceptions which are set out in
section 3-417 (1).18 As will be seen in the ensuing discussion, the
exceptions in section 3-417 (1) to the finality rule of section 3-418
bring the provisions of the code generally into line with present con-
cepts of recovery of monies paid by mistake in this area.
It is significant, however, that the exceptions to the finality rule of
section 3-418 are accomplished by providing for warranties made by
"any person who obtains payment or acceptance and any prior trans-
feror. . . to a party who pays or accepts in good faith. '181 The war-
ranty theory is a departure from present concepts. Sections 3-417 (1)
and 3-418, operating together, seem to eliminate rights of payors and
acceptors based on quasi-contract and limit their rights of recovery to
theories of warranty. Introduction of the warranty theory changes
the elements necessary to support any claim, e.g., proof of reliance in
good faith, as well as the remedies available, e.g., rescission as well as
damages. Negligence of the payor or acceptor should not be a relevant
factor under the code. Applicable statutes of limitations would be
affected in+ many instances.
Payment or acceptance of drafts bearing forged or unauthorized
signature of drawer: Under the NIL there has been considerable
doubt in the case of a forged drawer's signature whether section 62182
was intended to codify the rule of finality in Price v. Neal,'88 whether
this rule should apply only to payments made to holders in due course,
and whether protection of this rule should be denied to a negligent
recipient of payment.'84 Section 3-418 attempts to end the un-
180 The exception relating to recovery of bank payments in the article on Bank De-
posits and Collections (§4-301) is not considered here.
181 Sec. 3-417(1). Note that by providing that such warranties are made by "any prior
transferor," the payor or acceptor is given rights as to remote parties in the chain of transfer
of the instrument. Observe, also, that warranties similar to those in §3417(1) are made in
the bank collection process (§4-207C1)). There are differences, however, in the operation
of these two sets of warranties. Under §3-417(1), the warranties are made only to the
Vayor or acceptor, whereas under §4-207(1), the warranties are made by the customer to
his depositary bank and by the customer and a collecting bank to all subsequent inter-
mediary banks as well as to the payor. Under §3-417(1) the warranties are made "[u]nless
otherwise agreed," thus making it possible to contract against liability on such warranties.
There is no such provision in §4-207(1).
182Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §439.64, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) §19.104.
183 3 Burr. 1354 (1762).
184See Aigler, "The Doctrine of Price v. Neal," 24 Mcm L. REv. 809 (1926).
Also, 28 1MicH. L. REv. 743 (1930).
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certainty by codifying the rule of Price v. Neal, limiting its operation to
protection of holders in due course, and making negligence of the
holder irrelevant. Since the Michigan courts have limited the protec-
tion of the rule of Price v. Neal to holders in due course,"8 5 section
3-418 would work no significant change in Michigan law.
Suppose, however, that the holder in due course learns of the
forgery of the drawer's signature before he procures payment or
acceptance from the drawee. The finality rule of section 3-418 will
not deny relief to the drawee because of the exception contained in
section 3-417 (1) (c). Under this subsection, the holder in due course
warrants "that he has no knowledge that the signature of the . . .
drawer is unauthorized."'"" Consequently, the drawee can recover
payments made or avoid the acceptance on a theory of breach of
warranty.
But suppose the instrument bearing the forged drawer's signature
has been accepted by the drawee before it comes into the hands of the
holder in due course and then the holder learns of the forgery. If he
presents the instrument and receives payment from the drawee-
acceptor is he liable for breach of warranty? Not if it is a check,
because the warranty of section 3-417 (1) (c) is not made "by a
holder in due course who has taken a draft drawn on and accepted by a
bank after such . . . signature." In other words, the finality rule of
section 3-418 is operative. Does the reference to drafts "drawn on and
accepted by a bank" deny the same protection to holders in due course
of other forms of drafts in these circumstances? Although the language
certainly so indicates, comment 6 following section 3-417 states that
when a holder in due course takes an already accepted draft and then
"discovers the unauthorized signature, he is not deprived of his right
to enforce the obligation of the certifying bank or other acceptor
"187
Payment or acceptance of drafts under mistake as to condition of
drawer's account: Under section 3-418, payment or acceptance would
be final as to a holder in due course where the drawee has accepted or
paid out money despite insufficient funds in the drawer's account.
This is in line with Michigan decisions which have reached this result
185American Surety Co. v. Industrial Sav. Bank, 242 Mich. 581, 219 N.W. 689
(1928), noted in 27 MICH-. L. Rnv. 100 (1928); Indemnity Co. v. Bank of Lansing, 327
Mich. 19, 41 N.W. (2d) 468 (1950); Peninsular State Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 245
Mich. 179, 182, 222 N.W. 157 (1928) (dictum). See also Andrews v. Citizens State
Bank, 251 Mich. 658, 232 N.W. 185 (1930).
186 For definition of "unauthorized signature" see note 175 supra.
187 Italics added.
208 [ Vol. 5 3
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE2
where the drawee bank has certified a check despite insufficiency of
funds to cover it.' Presumably the same result would obtain under
section 3-418 where the drawee mistakenly pays to a holder in due
course a check against which the drawer has issued a stop payment
order." 9 Of course, if a holder in due course knows of the stop pay-
ment order when he procures acceptance or payment, some remedy
should be available to the drawee. Under the code, the drawee would
have a remedy for breach of warranty because one who obtains payment
or acceptance warrants to a party who pays or accepts in good faith
"that he has no knowledge or [of?] any effective direction to stop
payment."
Payment of notes bearing forged or unauthorized signature of
maker: The finality rule of section 3-418 is applicable to payment to a
holder in due course of a note on which the signature of the maker has
been forged. There is one important variation, however, when com-
pared with the operation of the rule on forged drafts. When a holder
in due course of a note later learns of the forgery, he may, nevertheless,
collect the note and retain the payment. Such a holder does not make
the warranties on presentment for payment which are set forth in sec-
tion 3-417 (1) (c).
Payment or acceptance of instruments bearing forged or unauthor-
ized indorsement: The finality rule of section 3-418 would not apply
to payments made on drafts or notes bearing a forged indorsement.
This exception to the finality rule is again accomplished through the
device of a warranty by the presenter that "he has a good tide to the
instrument or is authorized to obtain payment or acceptance on behalf
of one who has good tide."' ° If any indorsement on the instrument is
forged or unauthorized, the warranty of tide is breached and a claim for
damages can be asserted by the payor or acceptor against the recipient
of payment or any prior transferor who can be shown to have breached
this warranty.
Heretofore, this same result has generally been reached on quasi-
contractual theories of recovery of monies paid by mistake. 9 How-
ever, a few courts have allowed recovery on a breach of warranty
188 Union Trust Co. v. Preston Nat. Bank, 136 Mich. 460, 99 N.W. 399 (1904);
First Nat. Bank v. Union Trust Co., 158 Mich. 94, 122 N.W. 547 (1909); Smith v.
Hubbard, 205 Mich. 44, 171 N.W. 546 (1919).
189 See §4-407 for broad subrogation rights given to a bank which has paid an item
over a stop payment order.
190 Sec. 3-417(1)(a).
191 See, e.g., Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, 1 Hill (N.Y.) 287 (1841).
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theory.'92 In Michigan, recovery has generally been allowed on
theories of mistake.19  However, in National Bank v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co. 9 ' the drawee bank was allowed to recover from the pre-
senter, who signed his name on the back of the checks when he received
payment, on the theory that when he "indorsed the checks . .. [he]
thereby guaranteed the genuineness of prior indorsements .... 95
This sounds like warranty. Despite the National Bank case, it seems
fair to say that the code would change theories of recovery in Michigan
from quasi-contractual concepts of mistake to breach of warranty.
The Michigan courts deny recovery to a drawee bank which fails
promptly to notify persons who received payment of the forged indorse-
ment if the delay in notification caused prejudice to the recipient of
payment.'96 Also, the drawee bank cannot recover if there is proof of
actual negligence on the part of the drawee bank in failing to detect
the forged indorsement.'97 Recovery is barred in these cases on theo-
ries of etoppel. Could the drawee bank be similarly estopped from
recovery in these situations where claim is made for breach of warranty
under the code?
Since one element of the breach of warranty action under the code
would be a showing of damage, attention should be called to the hold-
ing of the Michigan court in Merchant's National Bank v. Federal
State Bank.' In this case, drawee bank brought an action in assumpsit
to recover monies paid by mistake on two checks bearing forged in-
dorsements. The court found that the drawer of the checks had indi-
rectly received benefits from the use of the checks despite the forged
indorsements. Therefore, the court speculated, the drawer could not
have forced the drawee bank to reimburse its account. As a result,
drawee bank had suffered no loss justifying recovery. Questionable
as this holding may be, 9 the result would be no different under the
192 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 63 S.Ct. 573 (1943).
'93 Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 261 Mich. 450, 246 N.W. 178
(1933).
194291 Mich. 36 at 40, 288 N.W. 325 (1939).
195 One might well question whether the court is correct in calling the presenter's sig-
nature on the back of the instrument an "indorsement." The bank is payor, not a purchaser,
of the instrument and the presenter is not a transferor when he demands payment. At best,
his signature on the back of the instrument is a mere receipt of payment.
196 See discussion in Merchant's Nat. Bank v. Federal State Bank, 206 Mich. 8, 172
N.W. 390 (1919).
197 Peninsular State Bank v. First Nat. Bank, 245 Mich. 179, 222 N.W. 157 (1928).
198 206 Mich. 8, 172 N.W. 390 (1919).
199 The holding was criticized in Pennsylvania Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, (D.C.
Pa. 1939) 30 F. Supp. 982 at 985.
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code, for the rationale of this decision would make it impossible to show
damages arising out of the breach of warranty.
Under present theories of recovery of monies paid by mistake on an
instrument bearing a forged indorsement, the ultimate loss will nor-
mally fall on the person who took the instrument from the forger.
For example, payee's indorsement is forged by X, who transfers to A,
who transfers to B, who receives payment from drawee. Drawee nor-
mally will recover from B, who then will recover from A, who must
look to X, the forger, for recovery or bear the loss. The same end
result may be reached under the code but not in exactly the manner
which might be expected. Under section 3-417(l)(a), both A (as a"prior transferor") and B (as a "person who obtains payment") have
breached their warranties of good title to the drawee. Suppose the
drawee recovers from B for breach of warranty. Can B then recover
from A for breach of warranty under section 3-417(1)(a) as might be
expected? No, because A's warranty as a "prior transferor" runs only
to the party who pays, i.e., drawee."'0 B may, however, be able to
recover from A for breach of warranty under section 3-417(2)(a) or
(c). Or isn't it possible he might still be able to recover on theories of
quasi-contract?
Payment or acceptance of drafts containing material alterations:
There is a dearth of Michigan decisions dealing with the right of a
drawee to recover monies paid by mistake on a bill or check which has
been materially altered. One very early case 01 indicates, however,
that traditional theories of recovery of monies paid by mistake would
be followed and the drawee could recover. Broadly speaking, a similar
result would obtain under the code by virtue of the warranty, set forth
in section 3-417(1)(c), that "the instrument has not been materially
altered.... ." Several problems may arise in connection with the opera-
tion of this warranty. Could a drawee who negligently fails to dis-
cover the alteration or who fails to give reasonable notification of the
discovery of the alteration recover for breach of the warranty? If the
drawee recovers from the person to whom he paid, could there then
be recovery back along the chain of transfer of the instrument until the
forger is reached? In many cases this should be possible but not on
the warranty of section 3-417(l)(c). Instead, recovery would depend
upon the warranty of section 3-417(2)(b) or quasi-contractual theories.
200 Compare similar warranties in bank collection process which run to all subsequent
participants in the process of collection (24-207(1)).
201 Little v. Derby, 7 Mich. 325 (1859).
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Observe that the warranty against material alteration would not be
made by a "holder in due course who has taken a draft drawn on and
accepted by a bank after such alteration. 2 °2 Thus the accepting bank
would no longer be able to escape the obligation to pay the instrument
to a holder in due course according to its altered terms by accepting
"payable as originally drawn" or in equivalent terms. Suppose that the
check is altered after acceptance and then is mistakenly paid by the
certifying bank to a holder in due course according to its altered terms.
Shouldn't the bank bear the burden of loss resulting from its failure
to recognize the alteration just as the maker of a note bears the risk of
recognizing alterations under the code? Under section 3-417()(c),
however, the holder in due course who received payment in these
circumstances would be liable for breach of warranty.
Payment of notes containing material alterations: On principle it
seems fair to deny the maker of a note the right to recover payments
made in error because the note has been altered. As maker, he should
detect any forgery altering its terms. This is the result which would
prevail under the code as to any holder in due course who received
payment of the altered instrument.
Payment of drafts accompanied by forged documents: The situa-
tion where a drawee pays a genuine draft accompanied by a forged
document, e.g., bill of lading, warehouse receipt, etc., is not covered by
the code. The overwhelming weight of authority is that the drawee
cannot recover monies so paid on theories of mistake.2"' The courts of
Michigan follow this view and could continue to do so under the
code.2 o4
Section 3-419. Conversion of Instrument; Innocent Representative.
(1) An instrument is converted when
(a) a drawee to whom it is delivered for acceptance refuses
to return it on demand; or
(b) any person to whom it is delivered for payment refuses
on demand either to pay or to return it; or
(c) it is paid on a forged indorsement.
(2) In an action against a drawee under subsection (1) the measure
of the drawee's liability is the face amount of the instrument. In any
202 This exception to the warranty against material alteration apparently applies only
to checks. Mhy?
203 See, e.g., Springs v. Hanover Nat. Bank, 209 N.Y. 224, 103 N.E. 156 (1914).
204 First Nat. Bank of Detroit v. Burkham, 32 Mich. 328 (1875).
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other action under subsection (1) the measure of liability is presumed
to be the face amount of the instrument.
(3) A representative, including a depositary or collecting bank,
who has in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commer-
cial standards applicable to the business of such representative dealt
with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was not the
true owner is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the true owner
beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands.
Since section 3-410 eliminates virtual acceptances, section 3-419
(1)(a) gives a remedy of conversion to the holder against a drawee
who refuses to return, upon demand, an instrument delivered for ac-
ceptance. Under section 3-419(2) the damages in such a conversion
action are fixed at the face amount of the instrument. If an instrument
is delivered for payment and the drawee or maker, on demand, refuses
to pay or return it, there is liability to the holder for conversion under
section 3-419(1)(b). Again, under section 3-419(2), the drawee's
liability is fixed at the face amount of the instrument; however, the
maker's liability is simply presumed 20 5 to be the face amount of the
instrument. Under section 3-419(1)(c) an instrument is converted
when "it is paid on a forged indorsement. ' 20  The drawee or maker
who pays the instrument bearing a forged indorsement is liable to the
rightful holder for conversion with the measure of liability determined
pursuant to section 3-419(2). This would change the questionable
result in Gordon Fireworks Co. v. Capital National Bank.207
In Michigan a cashing or collecting bank is liable to the rightful
holder for conversion 208 and in assumpsit °9 if it cashes or collects money
on an instrument bearing a forged indorsement. No distinction is
drawn between a bank which is an outright purchaser of the forged
instrument and one which simply takes the forged instrument as a
depositary for collection or along the line in the collection process. For
205 Section 1-201(31) defines "presumed" as meaning "that the trier of fact must find
the existence of the fact presumed unless and until evidence is introduced which would
support a finding of its non-existence."
206 Section 3-404 declares any "unauthorized signature" wholly inoperative. Section
1-201 defines "unauthorized signature" as one "made without actual, implied or apparent
authority and includes a forgery." Since an "unauthorized signature" is inoperative,
shouldn't the claim for conversion under §3-419(1)(c) cover a situation where an instru-
ment bearing an unauthorized as well as a forged indorsement is paid? Yet isn't this possi-
bility eliminated by use of the narrower term "forged indorsement" rather than "unauthor-
ized indorsement"?
207 236 Mich. 271, 210 N.W. 263 (1926).
208 See note 105 supra.
209 See note 106 supra.
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example, in Kaufman v. State Savings Bank2l1  the defendant bank
purchased a draft outright and took a check for collection. Both in-
struments bore a forged indorsement. When the check was collected
the defendant bank paid over the proceeds. The rightful owner recov-
ered from defendant bank for conversion of both instruments. Under
the code the result would be different. Section 3-419(3) provides that
a representative, "including a depositary or collecting bank,"'" who
has "dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was
not the true owner is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the true
owner beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands."
Since the defendant bank in the Kaufman case purchased the draft
rather than taking it for collection, it would be liable for conversion
of this item. As to the check, however, the defendant bank would be
in the position of a "depositary or collecting bank" which had paid over
the proceeds, hence it would have no liability for conversion under
section 3-419(3). The provision in section 3-419(3) against liability
"in conversion or otherwise" would read out liability in assumpsit.212
210 151 Mich. 65, 114 N.W. 863 (1908).
211 "'Depositary bank' means the first bank to which an item is transferred for collec-
tion even though it is also the payor bank." §4-105(a). "'Collecting bank' means any
bank handling the item for collection except the payor bank." §4-105(d).
212 Compare Brown v. People's Nat. Bank, 170 Mich. 416, 136 N.W. 506 (1912).
[Vol. 53
